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WHO IS GOING TO PAY THE BILLS: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE FINANCING AND LEASE OPTIONS AVAILABLE
TO THE BUFFALO BILLS AND RALPH
WILSON STADIUM
I. INTRODUCTION
The Buffalo Bills have a remarkable and, at the very least,
memorable football history filled with many successes and dramatic
shortcomings.1  In the eyes of many, the Bills are known for coming
up short, notoriously exemplified by four consecutive Super Bowl
losses in the early 1990s.2  This string of bad luck followed the Bills
into the new millennium, leaving the team with the longest playoff
drought in the National Football League (NFL) entering the 2012
football season.3  Recently, however, the Bills’ troubles have ex-
tended off the field in the form of lease negotiations with Erie
County regarding their home venue, Ralph Wilson Stadium.4
Since 1973, Erie County, the municipal owner of Ralph Wilson
Stadium, has leased the stadium to the Erie County Stadium Corpo-
ration, an entity formed to represent New York State, which in turn
leased the stadium to the Buffalo Bills.5  This lease agreement was
set to expire on July 31, 2013, but on September 12, 2012, the par-
1. See Mike Lopresti, Buffalo Bills Fondly Recall Four Consecutive Super Bowl Losses,
USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2011, 8:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/colum-
nist/lopresti/2011-01-30-lopresti-buffalo-bills-super-bowl_N.htm (describing how
Buffalo Bills repeatedly made Super Bowl appearances “even as the nation turned
them into a punch line for futility”); see also Bob Siuda, 20 Years Later, Wide Right
Continues to Haunt Buffalo Bills Fans, SYRACUSE.COM (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:34 AM),
http://blog.syracuse.com/sports/2011/01/20_years_later_wide_right_cont.html
(recalling Super Bowl XXV where Buffalo Bills kicker Scott Norwood missed game-
winning field goal by kicking it just outside right field goal post).
2. See Lopresti, supra note 1 (remembering four straight Buffalo Bills Super R
Bowl losses in early 1990s).
3. See Paul Howard, The Blundering Bills: Longest Playoff Drought in the League,
FOOTBALL NATION (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.footballnation.com/content/the-
blundering-bills-longest-playoff-drought-the-league/13247/ (noting “[i]t has been
a dozen years since the Buffalo Bills have reached any kind of success in entering
the Playoffs.  This is the longest lapse of time in the league.”).
4. See Jim Heaney, Taxing Questions Regarding The Bills, ARTVOICE (Apr. 19,
2012), http://artvoice.com/issues/v11n16/special_report/ (stating that Bills’
“lease on Ralph Wilson Stadium expires in July 2013” and identifying issues that
need to be resolved).
5. See Buffalo Bills Draft Lease Agreements, ERIE.GOV, http://www.erie.gov/bills
lease/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (containing Master Lease between Erie County
and Erie County Stadium Corporation and Stadium Lease between Erie County
Stadium Corporation and Buffalo Bills).
(663)
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ties agreed to extend the current lease agreement for one year if a
new lease agreement was not in place by July 31, 2013, effectively
granting Erie County and the Bills an extra year to negotiate a suita-
ble long-term agreement.6
Two fundamental obstacles prevented the parties from reach-
ing a new lease agreement in the fall of 2012.7  First, the Bills
sought a financial commitment from Erie County to make renova-
tions to Ralph Wilson Stadium.8  The Bills believed the taxpayers of
Erie County and New York State should provide a substantial por-
tion of the funding for such renovations through public financing.9
In response, Erie County sought to protect itself against the possi-
bility that the Bills franchise will relocate soon after the two sides
enter into a new lease agreement, effectively leaving the Buffalo
community without an NFL franchise and leaving the taxpayers of
Erie County and New York State with the burden of paying for a
newly renovated stadium.10  Therefore, it can be shown that the
parties faced two distinct yet intertwined issues in reaching a new
lease agreement: (1) how to fund the renovations to Ralph Wilson
Stadium and how to allocate the renovation cost between public
funding (i.e. government subsidies, tax increases, etc.) and private
funding (i.e. the Bills franchise, the NFL, etc.), and (2) what guar-
antees should be in place to discourage the Bills franchise from
6. See id. (indicating in recitals of Stadium Lease that lease expires on July 31,
2013); see also Bills, County Agree to 1-year Lease Extension, SI.COM (Sept. 12, 2012,
11:35 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/football/nfl/09/12/bills-lease.
ap/index.html (revealing “[s]talled lease negotiations have led to the Buffalo Bills
and Erie County favoring a one-year lease extension that would allow the team to
keep playing at Ralph Wilson Stadium next season while talks continue on a long-
term deal”).
7. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (presenting positions of parties R
and two central issues that must be addressed before new lease agreement can be
reached).
8. See Denise Jewell Gee & Gene Warner, Next Lease for ‘The Ralph’ Likely to Be
the Last, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 8, 2012, at D1, available at http://buffalonews.
com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121007/CITYANDREGION/121009335 (re-
porting that Bills, represented by owner Ralph Wilson, Jr., “want the state and the
county to put some substantial money into fixing [Ralph Wilson Stadium] up . . . .
It’s crumbling right now.  But we don’t want a Taj Mahal.  We just want a nice,
clean place to watch a football game.”).
9. See id. (explaining why New York State and Erie County should provide
substantial amount of money for renovations).
10. See Denise Jewell Gee, Bills’ Buyout Fee Could Pass $50 million, THE BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 22, 2012, at A2, available at http://www.buffalonews.com/apps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20120923/CITYANDREGION/120929601/1010 (reporting that
taxpayers need to be protected if Bills franchise were to relocate; observers of Bills
lease negotiations expect figures of $50 to $100 million as liquidated damages to
deter franchise relocation).
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relocating and how can the taxpayers’ investment in the stadium
renovation be protected.11
Fortunately for the Bills, there have been several recent sta-
dium construction and renovation projects from which the con-
tracting parties could learn, including the construction of MetLife
Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey; Cowboys Stadium in Ar-
lington, Texas; Lucas Oil Stadium in Indianapolis, Indiana; the ren-
ovation of Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Missouri; and the
future construction of the Forty-Niners’ new stadium in Santa
Clara, California.12  Additionally, several professional sports teams
have faced similar dilemmas to the Bills’ in structuring lease agree-
ments, especially pertaining to the public and private financing of
stadium construction and renovation.13  From 1990 to 2000, sev-
enty-seven major league teams in professional football, baseball,
basketball, and hockey experienced stadium lease re-negotiations,
stadium renovations, or stadium construction at a cost of approxi-
mately $12 billion.14
While other professional sports franchises have successfully un-
dergone stadium renovations, the situation in Buffalo extends be-
yond mere financing concerns.15  Underlying the development of a
new lease agreement is a concern over the health of an aging
owner, Ralph Wilson, Jr., who intends to own the Bills until he
passes away.16  Upon Mr. Wilson’s death, the team will be placed in
a trust and sold by Mr. Wilson’s family.17  The uncertainty as to
11. For a further discussion of parties’ interests and positions in creating new
lease agreement, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. R
12. For a further discussion of the sources of funding used to finance the
construction of MetLife Stadium, Cowboys Stadium, Lucas Oil Stadium, the reno-
vation of Arrowhead Stadium, and the future construction of the Forty-Niners new
stadium in Santa Clara, California, see infra notes 143-163 and accompanying text. R
13. See Martin J. Greenberg, Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of
1999, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 383, 384-87 (2000) (introducing and exploring public
and private sources used to finance sports stadiums and how teams and municipali-
ties have historically allocated costs of building new stadiums between such public
and private sources).
14. See id. at 383 (revealing “[s]ince 1990, there have been seventy-seven ma-
jor league facility lease re-negotiations, modernizations, or newly constructed
projects in professional football, baseball, basketball and hockey at an approximate
cost of $12 billion”).
15. For a further discussion of how the Bills situation is complicated by uncer-
tain ownership, see infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. R
16. For a further discussion of the concerns over the health of Ralph Wilson,
Jr., see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. R
17. See Tim Graham, Goodell Wants Bills in WNY But No Guarantees, THE BUF-
FALO NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://blogs.buffalonews.com/press-cover-
age/2012/08/goodell-wants-bills-in-wny-but-no-guarantees.html (reporting NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell stated, “Mr. Wilson has made it very clear that he is
3
Bolas: Who is Going to Pay the Bills: An Examination of the Financing an
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS211.txt unknown Seq: 4 14-JUN-13 15:10
666 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 663
when and to whom the franchise will be sold amplified the concern
over the Bills’ future in western New York because it raises the pos-
sibility that a wealthy group of investors may swoop in after Mr. Wil-
son’s death, purchase the franchise, and subsequently relocate the
Bills.18
With seemingly incredible clairvoyance, a sports and entertain-
ment law practitioner described some of the problems associated
with developing lease agreements for professional sports franchises,
such as the Buffalo Bills:
Driven by pressure to increase revenues, teams may
threaten public landlords with relocation if demands for
renovated or replacement facilities are not met.  In many
circumstances, those threats are bolstered by offers from
competing jurisdictions intent on luring franchises away
from their current homes.  Proposals to allocate public
funding to professional sports facilities often spark heated
debates . . . . While decisions to commit public funding to
the renovation or development of a sports stadium or
arena will rest with civic and business leaders . . . .19
The issues presented by the public financing of stadiums com-
bined with the pressures and costs associated with relocation threats
have led to a debate over the merits of supporting a new or reno-
vated stadium within a hosting municipality.20  With proper plan-
ning and oversight, many believe that renovated or new stadium
not going to sell the franchise while he’s alive, and once he passes on the franchise
will be sold.”); see also Albert Breer, NFL in L.A.? Five Teams Could Move, But Noth-
ing’s Imminent, NFL.COM (May 11, 2012, 1:09 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/
story/09000d5d82905f97/article/nfl-in-la-five-teams-could-move-but-nothings-im-
minent (reporting that “[t]he club’s succession plan is to put the team in a trust
and sell to the highest bidder”).
18. See Mike Florio, Bills Fans Should be Nervous About Losing Their Team to L.A.,
NBC SPORTS (June 19, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2011/06/19/bills-fans-should-be-nervous-about-losing-their-team-to-l-a/ (quoting
Jerry Sullivan, writer for The Buffalo News, who wrote, “When [92-year-old owner
Ralph] Wilson is gone, all bets are off . . . .  If he dies, the Bills would be at or near
the top of any list for possible relocation.  Wilson has no known succession plan.
He plans to have the team auctioned to the highest bidder.  It’s hard to imagine
the top bid coming from someone who intends to keep the Bills in [the Buffalo]
market.”).
19. Christine H. Steinberg, Developing Lease Agreements with Professional Sports
Franchises, 231 N.J. LAW 36, 37 (2004) (explaining why teams threaten to relocate
and how threats of relocation can place pressure on teams and landlords alike).
20. See generally id. (recognizing sports teams often use threats of relocation to
their advantage when negotiating with hosting municipalities and introducing no-
tion that at least sometimes it may not be advantageous to hosting municipality to
finance sports stadium construction).
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projects can be extremely beneficial to both a team and its city by
bolstering the revenue of businesses surrounding the stadium, fos-
tering civic pride, generating national exposure, and fulfilling
other public purposes.21  Conversely, opponents argue that the sum
of these rewards is not substantial enough to outweigh the burden
that is placed on the taxpayers by publicly financing such
stadiums.22
Although the merit of publicly financed sports venues is an is-
sue that pervades the examination and eventual selection of financ-
ing options, it is not the focus of this comment.23  This comment
focuses primarily on the options available for the Bills and Erie
County to finance stadium renovations and does not consider in
depth whether Erie County, or any other municipal party, should be
involved in the business of building and leasing sports stadiums.24
This is not to say that the interests of the taxpayers should not
be considered; to effectively negotiate and draft a new lease agree-
ment, all affected parties must be granted the opportunity to be
heard and those parties should use that opportunity to clearly state
their positions as well as their interests.25  For the Buffalo Bills, this
necessitates a reconciling of the interests of Ralph Wilson (the
owner and president of the Bills), the NFL (represented by Com-
missioner Roger Goodell), the economic interests of Erie County
and New York State, the taxpayers of those hosting municipalities,
21. See Laurie C. Frey, Comment, How the Smallest Market in Professional Sports
Had the Easiest Financial Journey: The Renovation of Lambeau Field, 18 SPORTS LAW J.
259, 261 (2011) (arguing “[t]he rewards of new or renovated stadiums are the
creation of landmarks, the fulfillment of public purposes, the production of reve-
nues, and the media exposure for both a team and its city”).
22. See Rodney Fort, Symposium, Stadiums and Public and Private Interests in
Seattle, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 311, 332 (2000) (arguing that benefits of publicly
funded stadiums are often overemphasized and such benefits may not be enough
to justify public funding of sports stadiums).
23. For a further discussion of instances when taxpayers have challenged the
legitimacy and legality of publicly financed stadiums, see infra notes 82-84 and ac- R
companying text.
24. For a further discussion of NFL stadium financing options and an analysis
of financing options available to the Bills, see infra notes 65-249 and accompanying R
text.
25. See generally id.; see also LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 18 (4th ed. 2009) (revealing that, “[i]n a position-based process, the par-
ties’ goals are strictly opposed.  In an interest-based process, the object is to recon-
cile interests, so both can, in some sense, ‘win’”); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Comment, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 758 (1984) (explaining “problem-solving model seeks to
demonstrate how negotiators, on behalf of litigators or planners, can more effec-
tively accomplish their goals by focusing on the parties’ actual objectives and cre-
atively attempting to satisfy the needs of both parties, rather than by focusing
exclusively on the assumed objectives of maximizing individual gain”).
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and the political leaders who represent those taxpayers.26  Only af-
ter all of these interests are considered can the Bills and Erie
County structure an effective lease agreement.27
In synopsis, several considerations underlie a successful lease
agreement between the Buffalo Bills and Erie County.28  These con-
siderations necessarily focus on the financing options available for
stadium renovations, including how the cost of renovations should
be allocated amongst the parties, and what type of guarantees or
early termination fees should be included to protect Erie County
and the affected taxpayers in the event of franchise relocation.29
II. BACKGROUND
Ralph Wilson Stadium is located in Orchard Park, New York,
approximately ten miles south of downtown Buffalo, New York.30
Before the construction of Ralph Wilson Stadium, the Bills played
their home football games at War Memorial Stadium in Buffalo,
New York.31  After the AFL and NFL merged in 1970, War Memo-
rial Stadium was deemed inadequate for an NFL franchise due to
its poor condition and its inadequate stadium capacity.32  The con-
26. See generally Mark Gaughan, Delay Puts Buffalo Bills Stadium Lease in Jeopardy,
THE BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:56 AM), http://blogs.buffalonews.com/
press-coverage/2012/09/delay-puts-bills-lease-in-jeopardy.html (recognizing diffi-
culty in bringing all parties to “negotiating table” and expecting delays in future
negotiation).
27. See Jerry Beach, Blackout & Lease Issues Cloud Bills’ Future, TICKET NEWS
(July 24, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.ticketnews.com/news/blackout-lease-issues-
cloud-bills-future071224134 (reporting that there was “a sizable gap to be bridged
in negotiations between the Bills and Erie County.  The Bills are reportedly seek-
ing at least $200 million in stadium renovations as part of any new lease agree-
ment, while Poloncarz told The Buffalo News he wants to make sure any lease . . .
‘keeps the Bills [in Buffalo] for many years to come.’”).
28. See Heaney, supra note 4 (reporting in April 2012 that, “it’s not too early R
to start posing questions about who should pay for what to keep the Bills in Buf-
falo. . . . [r]egarding Ralph Wilson Stadium, there are some key issues that need
addressing”).
29. For a further discussion of the major issues that the parties must address
before they execute an agreement, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. R
30. See Driving Distance from Buffalo, N.Y. to Orchard Park, N.Y., GOOGLE
MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then search
“A” for “Buffalo, NY” and search “B” for “Orchard Park, NY”; then follow “Get
Directions” hyperlink) (providing driving distance of fourteen miles and estimat-
ing direct distance from Buffalo to Orchard Park, New York to be approximately
ten miles).
31. See Buffalo Bills Stadium History, BUFFALO BILLS HISTORY, http://www.his-
tory.buffalobills.com/Stadium+History (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (providing his-
tory of Buffalo Bills franchise).
32. See id. (stating that “Buffalo War Memorial Stadium was both in disrepair
and deemed undersized for a National Football League team, with a capacity of
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struction of a new stadium became necessary, but the new stadium
project was quickly surrounded by uncertainty and consternation,
similar to the circumstances that surrounded the team and its home
stadium in 2012.33  Plans to construct an all-weather stadium in
Lancaster, New York fell through and subsequently became the sub-
ject of several years of litigation.34  In 1972, Erie County and the
Bills franchise settled on a location in Orchard Park, New York.35
Construction began in Orchard Park later that year and the sta-
dium first opened for play in 1973.36  That same year, the Bills and
Erie County entered into a twenty-five year stadium lease agree-
ment.37  In 1998, when the twenty-five year lease expired, the two
parties formed a new agreement extending the lease for fifteen
more years.38
A great deal of uncertainty has surrounded the Buffalo Bills
franchise, leaving many wondering whether Buffalo can afford to
keep the Bills, and if so, who should pay to keep them in Buffalo.39
These are not easy questions to answer.40  In April 2012, the Bills
requested renovations to Ralph Wilson Stadium costing approxi-
mately $200 million.41  While these proposed renovations might be
considered meager compared to some other recent stadium up-
grades within the league, the uncertainty surrounding the team’s
under 47,000 (league mandates instituted after the merger dictated a minimum of
50,000 seats)”).
33. See id. (indicating disagreement over where new Bills stadium should be
located, resulting in prolonged litigation).
34. See id. (noting Bills did not pursue plans to build new stadium in Lancas-
ter, New York); see also Kenford Co. Inc. v. Cnty. of Erie, 108 A.D.2d 132, 133-34
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (discussing breach of contract and damages stemming there-
from brought by investor who financed stadium that was never built in Lancaster,
New York).
35. See Buffalo Bills Stadium History, supra note 31 (providing history of Buffalo R
Bills franchise and noting that in 1972, Erie County and Bills decided to build
stadium in Orchard Park, New York).
36. See id. (revealing that stadium first opened for play in 1973).
37. See id. (indicating Bills and Erie County entered lease agreement for
twenty-five years in 1973).
38. See id. (indicating Bills and Erie County entered second lease agreement
for fifteen years in 1998).
39. See Heaney, supra note 4 (asking questions about “who should pay to keep R
the Bills in Buffalo” and noting “[t]he team’s lease on Ralph Wilson Stadium ex-
pires in July 2013”).
40. See id. (noting inability of parties to reach agreement with less than one
year remaining on current lease agreement).
41. See id. (reporting that “sources are saying the cost of renovating the facility
will run north of $200 million”).
7
Bolas: Who is Going to Pay the Bills: An Examination of the Financing an
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS211.txt unknown Seq: 8 14-JUN-13 15:10
670 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 663
ownership provides a complicating factor that must be considered
before any substantial investment is made in the Bills’ franchise.42
Striking a new lease agreement between the Bills and Erie
County is further complicated by several additional factors, perhaps
the most important being the health of the team’s elderly owner,
Ralph Wilson, Jr.43  Mr. Wilson is the founder, owner, and presi-
dent of the Buffalo Bills, and his ownership dates back to the begin-
ning of the American Football League in 1959, when he purchased
the Buffalo Bills for $25,000.44  Before the start of the 2012 football
season, Mr. Wilson was hospitalized for undisclosed reasons.45  Mr.
Wilson was released from the hospital before the Bills’ final
preseason game on August 30, 2012, and his family conveyed that
he was “doing very well.”46  However, at the age of ninety-three, Mr.
Wilson’s health remained an issue as it was well documented that
he often experienced issues with travel and mobility.47  For exam-
ple, throughout his ownership of the team Mr. Wilson enthusiasti-
42. See id. (noting “the cost of upgrading the home of the Green Bay Packers
and Kansas City Chiefs ran $295 million and $400 million respectively,” and recog-
nizing that there are complicating factors involved in lease negotiations, asking
“what guarantees should be built into an agreement to ensure the Bills remain [in
Buffalo] after Ralph Wilson dies?”).
43. See Stadium Negotiations to Continue, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 31, 2012, avail-
able at http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8323478/lease-talks-ongoing-buffalo-
bills-owner-ralph-wilson-hospital (reporting that ninety-three-year-old Ralph Wil-
son, Jr. “was listed in good condition after being taken to the hospital.  Concerns
about the Hall of Fame owner’s health come at a critical juncture for the franchise
he founded in 1960”).
44. See Lou Raguse, Ralph Wilson Center Dedicated in Canton, WIVB.COM (Aug.
3, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://www.wivb.com/dpp/sports/bills_and_nfl/ralph-wilson-
center-dedicated-in-canton (explaining that Mr. Wilson, at age 93, is oldest NFL
owner); see also Hall of Famers Ralph Wilson, Jr., PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http:/
/www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?PlayerId=281 (last visited Sept. 10,
2012) (describing Mr. Wilson as “the man responsible for reintroducing pro foot-
ball to western New York when . . . he formed the Buffalo Bills in 1959”); Seth
Wickersham, Wilson Valued for Impact on Past, Future, ESPN (Aug. 6, 2009), http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=wickersham_seth&id=4379510
(reporting that Mr. Wilson purchased Buffalo Bills franchise for $25,000).
45. See Stadium Negotiations to Continue, supra note 43 (reporting “93-year-old R
Wilson was listed in good condition after being taken to the hospital”).
46. See id. (affirming Mr. Wilson’s improving health following hospitaliza-
tion); see also Schedule, BUFFALO BILLS, http://www.buffalobills.com/schedules/
game-schedule.html (last visited on Sept. 8, 2012) (indicating date of Bills’ final
preseason game as August 30, 2012).
47. See Buffalo Bills Owner Ralph Wilson Hospitalized, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 30,
2012, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/story/2012-08-
30/Ralph-Wilson-hospitalized-Bills/57450228/1 (explaining that Mr. Wilson has
experienced mobility problems and travels less often); see also Raguse, supra note
44 (explaining Mr. Wilson had hip surgery in 2011 and concluding that “[a]t 93- R
years-old, [Mr. Wilson is] the oldest owner in the NFL and [he] doesn’t get around
like he used to”).
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cally attended both home and away games, but in 2011 he attended
only one Bills home game.48
The health of Ralph Wilson, Jr. is considered to be especially
crucial to the future of the Buffalo Bills because there is no appar-
ent ownership succession plan in place following his death.49  Mr.
Wilson intends to hold onto the team until he dies and, if no own-
ership succession plan is established by then, the team will be
placed in a trust and sold to the highest bidder.50  Consequently,
rumors pertaining to the future of the team, including talk of relo-
cation, have run rampant.51  For instance, widespread speculation
surfaced predicting that the Bills could be bought and relocated to
Los Angeles, a city seemingly desperate for an NFL team, as evi-
denced by the fact that the city approved plans to build a new NFL-
caliber stadium without first acquiring an NFL franchise.52
Other reports surfaced stating that Toronto, Ontario may be a
likely destination for the Bills should the team be bought and relo-
cated.53  This rumor is bolstered by the fact that the Bills seem to
have regional appeal in both Southern Ontario and Toronto, and
that Canadian fans have a piqued interest in the Bills which is fur-
48. See Buffalo Bills Owner Ralph Wilson Hospitalized, supra note 47 (explaining R
that Mr. Wilson experienced trouble traveling in 2011 and 2012).
49. See Graham, supra note 17 (reporting Bills franchise is not likely to stay in R
Wilson family as there has been no “change of heart that someone within [Mr.
Wilson’s] family would like to keep the team”); see also Mike Florio, Bills are Trying
to Make Buffalo More Enticing to the Next Owner, NBC SPORTS (June 23, 2011, 9:41
AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/06/23/bills-are-trying-to-make-
buffalo-more-enticing-to-the-next-owner/ [hereinafter Florio II] (reporting that
Bills do not appear to have any succession plan in place and once Mr. Wilson dies,
Bills are likely to sell to highest bidder, who could decide that it “makes good
business sense” to relocate Bills franchise).
50. See Graham, supra note 17 (reporting that NFL Commissioner Roger R
Goodell has stated, “Mr. Wilson has made it very clear that he is not going to sell
the franchise while he’s alive, and once he passes on the franchise will be sold”); see
also Breer, supra note 17 (reporting that upon Mr. Wilson’s death, Bills franchise R
will be placed in trust and then sold by Mr. Wilson’s heirs to highest bidder).
51. See Florio II, supra note 49 (reporting in 2011 that Buffalo Bills have “in- R
ched to the top of the ‘most likely to move to L.A.’ list”).
52. See id. (recognizing that Bills are amongst discussion for franchise reloca-
tion); see also Mike Florio, L.A. is Prepared to Take a Team in 2013, NBC SPORTS
(Sept. 30, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/30/l-a-
is-prepared-to-take-a-team-in-2013/ [hereinafter Florio III] (indicating that L.A. is
building new NFL-caliber stadium and is ready for team as early as 2013).
53. See Jason La Canfora, NFL Will Return to L.A. but Loose Ends Remain; Who
Arrives First? Rams? Chargers? Raiders?, CBS SPORTS (July 9, 2012, 11:58 PM), http://
www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/19545793/nfl-will-return-to-la-but-loose-ends-re-
main-who-arrives-first-rams-chargers-raiders (revealing that “Rogers Communica-
tions in Toronto would surely be interested” in purchasing Bills franchise “and
building a world class facility in Canada would make things interesting” for future
of Bills franchise).
9
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ther strengthened by the team’s 2008 agreement with Rogers Cen-
tre to play one home game per season at the Rogers Centre in
Toronto for five consecutive years.54  In 2012, the Bills extended
this agreement, and the team is now scheduled to play one home
game per season in Toronto through the 2017 season.55  Specula-
tion aside, no one knows exactly what the future holds for the Buf-
falo Bills, besides perhaps Mr. Wilson who, at the moment, appears
content to take his plans for ownership succession, if any, to his
grave.56
Further complicating a new lease agreement is the fact that the
Bills are a small market team located in a municipality in which the
population has steadily declined over the last fifty years.57  Popula-
tion statistics, combined with the Bills’ twelve-season playoff
54. See id. (stating “[t]here will be sufficient local ownership options when
Ralph Wilson passes, and the NFL believes among Western and Central New York,
Southern Ontario and Toronto, there is sufficient support to make it work with a
new facility”); see also Albert Breer, Five-Year Extension of Buffalo Bills’ Toronto Series
Approved, NFL.COM (May 22, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09
000d5d82943e05/article/fiveyear-extension-of-buffalo-bills-toronto-series-ap-
proved [hereinafter Breer II] (explaining that “the Bills first played a home game
in Toronto five years ago.  According to the AP, roughly 15 percent of the team’s
fans are now from southern Ontario, and the series has corresponded with a rise in
season-ticket sales to fans in that area.”).
55. See Breer II, supra note 54 (indicating that “[t]he NFL’s International R
Committee has approved a five-year extension of the Buffalo Bills’ agreement to
play games in Toronto, giving the team permission to continue the series from
2013 to 2017”).
56. Compare Sam Farmer, Roger Goodell Gives NFL Guidelines to Any Relocation to
L.A., L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2012, at C2, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/jun/29/sports/la-sp-nfl-la-goodell-20120630 (describing requirements set
forth by NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell for NFL team relocation and specifi-
cally identifying “San Diego Chargers, Oakland Raiders, St. Louis Rams,” and Jack-
sonville Jaguars as “relocation candidates” while making no mention of Buffalo
Bills), and Tim Graham, Goodell Emphasizes Importance of New Bills Lease, THE BUF-
FALO NEWS, Aug. 9, 2011, at D6, available at www.buffalonews.com/sports/bills-nfl/
article993416.ece (writing that NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell emphasized that
“people want the Bills to stay [in Buffalo], a new stadium lease is ‘a very high
priority,’ and the team will be sold after Ralph Wilson dies”), with Florio II, supra
note 49 (reporting in 2011 that Buffalo Bills have “inched to the top of the ‘most R
likely to move to L.A.’ list”); see also Gov. Appoints Expert to Advise, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8247657/governor-
andrew-cuomo-senator-charles-schumer-move-keep-buffalo-bills-town (reporting
that Ralph Wilson, Jr. has no intention of selling Bills in his lifetime, essentially
leaving it up to his heirs to sell team).
57. See James Walker, AFC East on Forbes List, ESPN (Sept. 8, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/afceast/post/_/id/47359/afc-east-on-forbes-list (ex-
plaining that Forbes valued Buffalo Bills to be worth $805 million in 2012, making
it fourth least valuable team in NFL); see also Ouch! City’s Population Down 10.7 Per-
cent in Last Decade, BUFFALO RISING (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.buffalo
rising.com/2011/03/ouch-citys-population-down-107-percent-in-last-decade.html
(reporting Buffalo’s “population is down 31,338 since 2000 to 261,310 as of April 1
2010.  Since 1950, the city’s population has plummeted 54.9 percent from
10
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drought, may explain why both the Bills and Erie County sought to
make certain that they were not bearing a disproportionate cost
and an unreasonable assumption of risk in striking a new
agreement.58
Substantial insight can be gained by focusing on the unique
history of the Bills franchise.59  In addition, an analysis of the fi-
nancing and lease negotiation strategies pursued by other NFL
teams can offer the Bills and Erie County a tremendous apprecia-
tion of common issues experienced by other NFL teams and strate-
gies that have proven successful in resolving them.60  Accordingly,
this comment begins by exploring the financing alternatives that
other NFL franchises have utilized for stadium construction and
renovation.61  These alternatives will then be used to analyze the
financing options available to the Bills and Erie County and New
York State to finance the renovations to Ralph Wilson Stadium.62
The second part of this article is dedicated to an analysis of the
tactics employed by NFL franchise hosting municipalities and the
NFL itself to deter an NFL franchise from relocating.63  In closing,
this article analyzes the contracting options available to the Buffalo
Bills and Erie County and New York State to deter the Bills from
relocating.64
580,132.  Erie County also lost population in the last decade.  The county’s popula-
tion is down 3.2 percent or 31,225 people.”).
58. See Bills’ Season Ticket Sales at 10-year low, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2011,
available at http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6971142/buffalo-bills-hit-10-year-
low-season-ticket-sales (explaining that in 2011, “[s]ix straight losing seasons, a
poor economy and the NFL lockout are being blamed for contributing to the Buf-
falo Bills’ lowest season-ticket sales total in a decade”); see also Darren Rovell, Jets
Have Highest Ticket Prices, ESPN (Sept. 7, 2012, 12:27 PM), http://espn.go.com/
nfl/story/_/id/8345872/average-nfl-ticket-price-jumps-25-percent (explaining
that Bills average ticket price is one of cheapest in NFL with average ticket price of
$58.36).
59. For a further discussion of historical background of Buffalo Bills, see supra
notes 30-58 and accompanying text. R
60. For a further discussion of financing options NFL teams have used for
stadium construction and contractual provisions used to deter relocation, see infra
notes 65-193 and notes 250-288 and accompanying text. R
61. For a further discussion of financing options NFL teams have used to
fund stadium construction, see infra notes 65-193 and accompanying text. R
62. For a further discussion and analysis of financing options available to
Bills, see infra notes 194-249 and accompanying text. R
63. For a further discussion of contracting provisions used by NFL teams to
deter relocation, see infra notes 250-288 and accompanying text. R
64. For a further discussion of contracting options as they relate to Buffalo
Bills, see infra notes 289-322 and accompanying text. R
11
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III. FINANCING STADIUM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATIONS
A. Public Funding
Between 1997 and 2011, twenty NFL teams obtained new or
refurbished stadiums with a majority of the financing for these sta-
diums obtained through public financing.65  There are several dif-
ferent ways in which a stadium can be publicly financed.66  The
various approaches examined below offer different benefits and
burdens that should be weighed by a team and its municipality
before a public funding option is utilized.67
1. State and Local Subsidies
MetLife stadium, home of the New York Jets and the New York
Giants, is the only stadium currently used by NFL teams that was
built without public funding or government subsidies.68  The re-
maining thirty NFL stadiums were all constructed using some de-
gree of public funding.69  Accordingly, it is evident that substantial
reliance is placed on public funding, including state and local subsi-
dies, to finance the construction or renovation of NFL stadiums.70
A major portion of the state and local subsidies used to finance
stadium construction is generated by proceeds received from tax-
exempt municipal bonds.71  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set forth
specific requirements that a municipality must follow for it to subsi-
65. See Recent NFL Stadiums, NFL.COM (Mar. 2012), http://prod.static.vikings.
clubs.nfl.com/assets/docs/stadium/DES-recent-nfl-stadiums.pdf (providing cost
allocation of fifteen most recent NFL stadium projects).
66. See Frey, supra note 21, at 265-67 (explaining various methods used to R
finance sports stadiums).
67. For further discussion of various public financing options available to
fund sports stadium construction, see infra notes 68-120 and accompanying text. R
68. See Pat Garofalo, How Americans Are Spending $4 Billion Subsidizing Profes-
sional Sports Stadiums, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/
economy/2012/09/05/801341/america-4-billion-sports-stadiums/ (reporting that
MetLife stadium in New Jersey is “the only NFL stadium that was built without
some sort of public support”).
69. See id. (reporting that “[t]ax exemptions on interest paid by muni bonds
that were issued for sports structures cost the U.S. Treasury $146 million a year,
based on data compiled by Bloomberg on 2,700 securities.  Over the life of the $17
billion of exempt debt issued to build stadiums since 1986, the last of which ma-
tures in 2047, taxpayer subsidies to bondholders will total $4 billion, the data
show.”).
70. See id. (reasoning that thirty out of thirty-two NFL teams and hosting mu-
nicipalities relied on some form of public funding to construct or renovate their
home stadiums).
71. See Garofalo, supra note 68 (reporting that “[t]ax exemptions on interest R
paid by muni bonds that were issued for sports structures cost the U.S. Treasury
$146 million a year, based on data compiled by Bloomberg on 2,700 securities”).
12
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dize the cost of stadium construction or renovation using tax-ex-
empt bonds.72  These municipal bonds are typically sold to
individuals with high marginal tax rates because the tax-exempt as-
pect of the bonds often allow for a greater after-tax rate of return
than investments carrying comparable risk that are not tax-exempt,
making them especially attractive to high-income individuals.73  Al-
most all stadium construction or renovation projects involve utiliz-
ing some form of tax-exempt municipal bonds; consequently, these
bonds are commonly viewed as one of the most effective sources of
public funding aimed at subsidizing stadium construction and ren-
ovation projects.74
Government subsidies for stadiums can also be made through
more indirect methods.75  For example, some stadiums receive an
exemption from property taxes, which often translates into a
franchise saving several million dollars a year.76  Sales tax exemp-
tions may also be available on materials used in stadium construc-
tion.77  This indirect form of a subsidy was included in the proposal
recently considered in Minnesota to subsidize the construction of a
new stadium for the Minnesota Vikings.78  Finally, many teams re-
ceive substantial subsidies from the state or local government for
stadium operating costs.79  For example, the Buffalo Bills’ current
72. See Frey, supra note 21, at 265 (explaining that “[i]n order to qualify for R
the bonds, ‘a project may exceed only one of the following criteria: 10 percent of
the bond proceeds must be used by a nongovernmental entity; or 10 percent of the
debt secured by property must be used directly or indirectly in a private
business.’”).
73. See Andrew H. Goodman, Note, The Public Financing of Professional Sports
Stadiums: Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 198 (2002) (explaining appeal of
tax-exempt bonds used to raise capital for stadium construction or renovation).
74. See generally id. (noting that issuing tax-free municipal bonds is frequently
used to finance stadium construction or renovation projects).
75. For a further discussion of more indirect ways in which municipalities may
subsidize cost of renovated or new stadium, see infra notes 76-80 and accompany- R
ing text.
76. See Garofalo, supra note 68 (reporting that “Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry R
Jones pays no property taxes on Cowboys Stadium, saving his franchise $17 million
per year”).
77. See Mike Ozanian, Minnesota Vikings Asking for Stadium Taxpayer Subsidy of
$77 Per Ticket, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mike
ozanian/2012/04/28/minnesota-vikings-asking-for-stadium-taxpayer-subsidy-of-77-
per-ticket/ (explaining that when calculating total public subsidies, sales tax ex-
emptions on construction materials must be taken into consideration).
78. See id. (reporting that financing for new stadium in Minnesota includes
property tax exemption on stadium and parking ramps and sales tax exemption on
construction materials used to build new stadium).
79. See Heaney, supra note 4 (reporting that under current lease, Bills operat- R
ing subsidy of $111 million is greater than capital costs of $101 million).
13
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lease provided for operating subsidies totaling approximately $111
million in operating costs over a fifteen-year period.80
Taxpayers who oppose public financing for the construction or
renovation of sports stadiums view such subsidies as greatly benefit-
ting team owners while placing a heavy debt on the city and state.81
It is no surprise that these types of subsidies have led to several law-
suits brought by taxpayers protesting the use of public funds for
stadium financing.82  Thus far, such taxpayer lawsuits have been un-
successful because courts recognize that there is some public pur-
pose served by the construction of professional sports stadiums.83
As long as there is some degree of public purpose served by stadium
construction, public funds may be allocated to fund such stadium
projects.84
2. Increase State and Local Sales Taxes
Use of state and local sales taxes can be an effective method by
which a team can finance a portion of the cost for a stadium con-
struction or renovation project.85  Generally, a sales tax applies to
certain tangible personal property or services.86  A sales tax increase
levied upon the citizens of a town, city, or county can be used to
80. See id. (acknowledging that public currently pays for substantial portion of
Bills’ operating costs under current lease agreement, which provides operating
subsidies totaling approximately $111 million over fifteen years).
81. See Greenberg, supra note 13, at 388 (describing arguments opposing use R
of public funding to finance sports stadiums).
82. See generally Poe v. Hillsborough Cnty., 695 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1997); Rowe v.
Pinellas Sports Auth., 461 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1984); King Cnty. v. Taxpayers of King
Cnty., 949 P.2d 1260 (Wash. 1997) (presenting taxpayer lawsuits against state and
local governments for publicly funding construction of sports stadiums).
83. See Poe, 695 So.2d at 679 (validating use of bonds to construct NFL sta-
dium in Tampa Bay, Florida and finding “that the Buccaneers instill civic pride
and camaraderie into the community and that Buccaneer games and other sta-
dium events also serve a commendable public purpose by enhancing the commu-
nity image on a nationwide basis and providing recreation, entertainment and
cultural activities to its citizens”).  “[L]ittle has been done to influence the ability
of the electorate to challenge a legislature’s actions or the understanding of tax-
payer rights.”  Elan Daniels, Note, The Cincinnati Bengals’ Legal Obligation to Win: A
Case Study for the Public Funding of Stadiums and a Roadmap for Municipal Investment, 5
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 99, 112 (2003) (recognizing that recent litigation
brought by taxpayers questioning validity of publicly financed sports stadiums have
led public purpose doctrine to become increasingly “toothless”).
84. See Poe, 695 So.2d at 679 (emphasizing requirement that public financing
of sports stadiums must provide some public purpose).
85. See Goodman, supra note 73, at 194-97 (exploring use of sales tax to fi- R
nance sports stadiums).
86. See Sales and Use Tax, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION, http://www.tax.ny.
gov/bus/st/stidx.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (defining sales tax in New York
State).
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target a specific geographic area that derives benefits from the pres-
ence of a professional sports team.87  Several hosting municipalities
of NFL teams have increased sales taxes to finance a portion of sta-
dium construction or renovations.88
In some instances, a sales tax increase on hosting municipali-
ties of NFL teams has been successful.89  When the Green Bay Pack-
ers renovated their home stadium in 2003, part of the financing for
the renovations came from a sales tax increase of 0.5 percent across
Brown County, the hosting municipality of the Packers.90  Although
the increase in sales tax barely received the support of a majority of
voters in Brown County, it proved to be successful because it was
implemented in conjunction with proper planning and oversight to
ensure that taxpayer money would not be wasted.91  In fact, as of
2011, it was anticipated that the funding received from the Brown
County sales tax increase will be paid off sooner than expected.92
Nevertheless, there are several concerns with obtaining financ-
ing through a sales tax increase.93  First, there is no guarantee that
87. See Sales Tax Rates and Identifying the Correct Local Tax Jurisdiction, N.Y.
STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION, http://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/st/sales_tax_rates.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (providing sales tax rates for various tax jurisdictions in New
York State).
88. See Recent NFL Stadiums, supra note 65 (indicating that six hosting munici- R
palities of NFL teams raised local sales taxes to finance portion of stadium con-
struction or renovation during last fifteen years).  The lowest sales tax increase was
in Denver where sales tax increased by 0.1 percent across multiple counties. See id.
(exhibiting public funding sources used to construct Invesco Field at Mile High).
Highest sales tax increases were in Dallas, Tampa Bay, Cincinnati, and Green Bay,
where sales tax increased by 0.5 percent in hosting cities or counties. See id. (ex-
hibiting public funding sources used to construct Cowboys Stadium, Raymond
James Stadium, and Paul Brown Stadium and public funding sources used to reno-
vate Lambeau Field).
89. See Frey, supra note 21, at 281 (recognizing that financing of stadium in R
Green Bay included 0.5 percent sales tax increase and concluding that financing
renovations of stadium in Green Bay “was more successful than financing other
stadiums in the past”).
90. See id. at 274 (explaining that sales tax increase of 0.5 percent was utilized
to provide additional source of public funding for renovation of Lambeau Field).
91. See id. (indicating that vote for increase in sales tax passed with 53 percent
support from taxpayers in affected county); see also id. at 281 (explaining that sta-
dium renovations in Green Bay “finished on budget, which saved citizens of Brown
County from paying more money than originally estimated”).
92. See id. at 280-81 (explaining that Brown County tax will likely be paid off
ahead of schedule and Brown County tax will end sometime in 2015).
93. See Reed Albergotti & Cameron McWhirter, A Stadium’s Costly Legacy
Throws Taxpayers for a Loss, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2011, at A1, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216330349497852.html
(describing reality of counties facing financial hardship after financing stadiums,
specifically examining problems encountered from sales tax increase in Hamilton
County, hosting municipality of Cincinnati Bengals).
15
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an increase in the applicable sales tax rate for a city or county will
translate into a corresponding increase in sales tax revenue.94  If
sales tax revenue decreases or if the sales tax revenue fails to in-
crease as projected, municipalities may be forced to refinance a
portion of the debt incurred from stadium renovations or seek al-
ternative sources of financing long after stadium renovations have
been completed.95  Additionally, even in a city or county with ex-
ceptional fan loyalty and team support, a sales tax increase in-
tended to finance renovations to a sports stadium is often a
controversial topic that can create much debate.96
3. Public Ownership
Public ownership is the least common method employed by
NFL franchises to finance stadium construction and renovation.97
In fact, the only team in the NFL that is publically owned is the
Green Bay Packers, which is owned by the surrounding community
of Green Bay, Wisconsin.98  Even though the Packers have been
publicly owned for almost ninety years, in 1997 the team offered a
sizeable stock sale to obtain funds to finance the renovation of
Lambeau Field, the home stadium of the Packers.99  The Packers’
stock offers no tangible benefits to its owners; the stock does not
offer free tickets nor does it offer any return on investment, since
all of the team’s profits are retained and reinvested back into the
franchise.100
94. See id. (revealing Cincinnati Bengals used sales tax increase to finance por-
tion of new stadium construction cost, but explaining that as soon as new stadium
was completed, sales tax revenue decreased and county was forced to refinance its
debt).
95. See id. (explaining that in Cincinnati, “[t]o help finance its stadiums,
Hamilton County assumed more than $1 billion in debt by issuing its own bonds
without any help from the surrounding counties or the state.  As debt service ratch-
ets up, officials expect debt payments to create a $30 million budget deficit by
2012.”).
96. See Frey, supra note 21, at 274 (indicating that vote for increase in sales tax R
to support stadium renovations to Lambeau Field passed with only 53 percent sup-
port from taxpayers of Brown County).
97. See id. at 272 (stating that only Green Bay Packers use public ownership
model in NFL).
98. See id. (indicating Green Bay Packers are only publicly owned team in
NFL).
99. See id. at 274 (stating that Green Bay Packers have been publicly owned
since 1923 and in 1997, Green Bay Packers offered significant stock sale).
100. See Patrick Hruby, The Right Way? The Green Bay Way, ESPN (Jan. 31,
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?page=hruby/
110131 (reporting that Packers’ ownership includes “112,158 shareholders who
own 4.7 million shares.  Only none of those individuals receives dividends.  They
don’t even get free tickets.”).
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Although the stock sale generated only $24 million of the $295
million required to renovate Lambeau Field, there are other rea-
sons why public ownership is so advantageous.101  In addition to
providing an influx of capital, public ownership inherently helps a
team and its supporting community avoid issues of ownership insta-
bility and relocation.102  This is due to the overwhelming likelihood
that a majority of the team’s stock will be bought by fans in the
team’s current market.103  In the case of the Packers, the fans’ in-
vestment in the team permeates the franchise.104  This is most obvi-
ously reflected by the Packers’ bylaws, which limit the number of
shares that one person can acquire and states that in the event the
team is sold, all proceeds from the sale shall be reinvested in the
community through public charities.105
Even though the Packers franchise has enjoyed tremendous
success with its public ownership model, this arrangement would be
difficult, if not impossible for an NFL team to replicate today.106
This is because the NFL has forbidden public ownership of NFL
franchises since 1961, allowing exceptions only for teams already
organized through public ownership.107  It would be extremely dif-
ficult for a team to persuade the NFL to change this policy without
101. See Frey, supra note 21, at 274 (reporting total cost of renovations at $295 R
million and stating that public sale generated $24 million, while increasing share-
holders from 1,940 to 109,723).  For a further discussion of other advantages of
the public ownership model, see infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. R
102. See Robert Taylor Bowling, Sports Aggravated: The Fan’s Guide to the
Franchise Relocation Problem in Professional Sports, 28 STETSON L. REV. 645, 666-67
(1999) (explaining why public ownership helps sports franchises avoid issues of
relocation).
103. See id. (reasoning that “[a] team owner in Atlanta would not likely find a
greater market for stock in his team outside the geographic area that the team calls
home.  Thus, a franchise seeking to raise money through a stock sale would rely on
the local fans to raise money.”).
104. See Hruby, supra note 100 (detailing specifics of Green Bay Packers’ pub- R
lic ownership model and recognizing beneficial safeguards which public owner-
ship can provide).
105. See id. (exploring Green Bay Packers’ bylaws and specifically identifying
limits on team stock acquisition and sale proceed reinvestment protocol).
106. See Bowling, supra note 102, at 665 (recognizing that former NFL com- R
missioner Paul Tagliabue believed that “the Green Bay Packers are a ‘historical
anomaly’ that could never be replicated in today’s sports climate”).
107. See Bowling, supra note 102, at 665 (explaining that public ownership is R
no longer allowed in NFL); see David Morris, Roots, Roots, Roots for the Home Team:
Community Owned Professional Sports, INST. FOR SELF-RELIANCE (Apr. 1, 1998), http:/
/www.ilsr.org/roots-roots-roots-home-team-communityowned-professional-sports/
(stating that NFL banned public ownership in 1961).
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challenging the NFL bylaws in court or obtaining congressional
intervention.108
Even if the policy prohibiting public ownership in the NFL
could be circumvented, community ownership would not work for
every NFL team because public ownership of a sports franchise cre-
ates an inefficient management structure and places a heavy em-
phasis on public funding for stadium construction and renovation,
which many taxpayers oppose.109  Although these circumstances
make it extremely difficult for a team to establish public ownership,
the Green Bay Packers’ arrangement encourages other teams to de-
vise novel and creative solutions to inadequate stadium financing
and ownership instability.110
4. Other Sources of Public Funding
A creative financing solution to provide public funding for sta-
dium renovations need not be as radical as the Green Bay Packers’
model of public ownership.111  There are several other sources of
public funding available for stadium development, and while these
financing options may not finance an entire stadium project by
themselves, collectively they can contribute a substantial amount of
funding to the construction or renovation of a stadium.112  For ex-
ample, cutting a portion of municipal public services to make more
capital available for the project could provide an influx of capital
108. See Daniels, supra note 83, at 148 (stating that issue of public ownership R
would arise when NFL team attempted to move because there would be conflict
between NFL bylaws and state laws, leading to litigation). See generally Morris, supra
note 107 (examining “Give Fans A Chance Bill” heralded by Representative Earl R
Blumenauer designed to overturn rule against public ownership and provide that
team give community sufficient notice and opportunity to purchase team before
relocation, among other protections against relocation).
109. See Frey, supra note 21, at 274 (explaining that public ownership “may R
not be as successful for . . . teams with a weaker fan base”); see Daniels, supra note
83, at 155 (indicating that “[t]here is likely to be strong opposition [to public R
ownership] by taxpayers who have been against the funding of stadiums from the
start.  Moreover, there is likely to be gross inefficiencies created through public
management of teams”).  For a further discussion of taxpayer objections to pub-
licly financed stadiums, see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. R
110. See generally Frey, supra note 21 (examining interesting and unique na- R
ture of Green Bay Packers’ ownership model).
111. See generally id. (exploring various options available to NFL teams and
hosting municipalities for stadium financing).  For a further discussion of other
sources of public financing available to NFL teams to finance stadium renovation
or construction, see infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text. R
112. See Goodman, supra note 73, at 196 (stating that “there are several fi- R
nancing options that public officials may utilize in subsidizing a stadium, and often
more than one are employed in concert”); see also Frey, supra note 21, at 266 (in- R
troducing several sources of revenue available to finance stadiums such as budget
cuts, sin taxes, and amusement taxes).
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that could be redistributed to a stadium project.113  The concern
with this financing strategy is that many municipalities are finan-
cially stretched and many public services have already been cut in
response to poor economic conditions.114
Another alternative is for the local government to create “sin
taxes,” or excise taxes placed on products such as alcohol or to-
bacco.115  Similarly, an amusement tax collected from entrance fees
at nightclubs, theatres, and sporting events has been utilized by at
least one NFL team as a revenue source for stadium financing.116
These types of taxes may be unpopular with some people, but like
any use tax, a citizen is not compelled to pay this tax unless he or
she chooses to partake in the specified taxable activity, making this
type of tax less inclusive than a general increase in sales tax.117
While there are several other methods of generating public fi-
nancing, the examples above provide a solid foundation for
franchises and governments to cater their financing efforts to their
respective region and team.118  Moreover, and importantly, there
are many ways to generate public financing.119  The means are lim-
ited only by the creativity of the municipality and its state and local
representatives.120
113. See Frey, supra note 21, at 266 (exploring state and municipal budget cuts R
for other public services as method for freeing up capital to finance stadium con-
struction or renovation).
114. See Karen DeWitt, State Officials Predict Tight Budget, WNYC (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/oct/02/state-officials-predict-
tight-budget/ (reporting that New York State is “preparing for another difficult
budget year” and state agencies have been advised to refrain from adding addi-
tional spending to budget after $10 billion was cut from New York State budget
only two years ago).
115. See Goodman, supra note 73, at 196 (arguing that sin taxes may be used R
as source of revenue for financing of stadium and such taxes “face minimal opposi-
tion from politicians and voters, likely because of implications of moral
correctness”).
116. See Frey, supra note 21, at 266 (explaining that Baltimore Ravens used R
“amusement taxes collected from fees at nightclubs, theatres, and sporting events”
to finance M&T Bank Stadium).
117. See Goodman, supra note 73, at 196 (explaining that these taxes do not R
“include the entre geographic attendance region”).
118. See id. at 194 (stating that “[e]ach stadium effort, along with its corre-
sponding municipality, aims to fashion a revenue raising strategy unique to the
particularities of local citizenry, public obligations, and the goals of the projects”).
119. See generally Goodman, supra note 73, at 194 (exploring several possibili- R
ties for hosting municipality to publically finance sports stadium).
120. See generally Frey, supra note 21, at 266 (highlighting creative solutions to R
generate public financing, such as Amusement Tax utilized in Baltimore,
Maryland).
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B. Major Sources of Private Funding
In contrast to public sources of funding, several private sources
of funding are available to NFL franchises to build or renovate
sports stadiums.121  Between 1997 and 2011, twenty NFL stadiums
were built or refurbished.122  These twenty stadiums obtained an
average of fifty-nine percent of their financing through public
sources and forty-one percent from private sources.123  Accordingly,
private funding is a source of stadium financing that must be thor-
oughly explored by an NFL team wishing to build or renovate a
stadium.124
1. G4 Loan
The NFL’s G4 loan program provides funds for NFL teams
seeking to finance renovation or new stadium projects.125  Under
the most recent collective bargaining agreement in 2011, the NFL
approved the G4 loan program, which provides loans of up to $250
million to NFL franchises for stadium renovations and up to $200
million for new stadium construction.126  The loan is financed by a
percentage of the NFL league revenue generated from premium
seating sales and the terms of the loan provide that it must be paid
back over a fifteen-year period.127
121. For a further discussion of major sources of private funding for NFL
teams, see infra notes 122-193 and accompanying text. R
122. See Recent NFL Stadiums, supra note 65 (listing twenty NFL stadiums built R
or renovated between 1997 and 2011).
123. See id. (listing public and private contribution percentages for new or
renovated NFL stadiums from 1997-2011 and indicating average of 58.8 percent of
financing was provided by public funding and 41.2 percent of financing was pro-
vided by private funding, based on calculations made from specific stadium
statistics).
124. See generally id. (finding average of 41.2 percent of cost for stadiums con-
structed between 1997 and 2011 was financed by private funding).
125. See Jaboner Jackson, NFL in LA: New NFL Television Contracts and G4 Sta-
dium Financing, FOOTBALLPHDS.COM (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.footballphds.
com/2011/12/15/nfl-in-la-new-nfl-television-contracts-and-g4-stadium-financing/
(reporting that G4 program allows teams to receive loan from NFL for specific
purpose of providing source of funding for stadium construction and renovation).
126. See id. (explaining that, “[u]nder the newest Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) signed this year between the NFL Owners and NFL Players Asso-
ciation, a provision for revenue credits was included in the CBA that amounted to
stadium credits of 1.5% of total league revenue,” and stating that new G4 loan
program provides for up to $200 million loan for new stadium and up to $250
million for stadium renovation to be repaid over fifteen years through premium
seating revenue).
127. See id. (indicating “repayment of G4 financing by the team over 15 years
through revenues related to premium seating”).
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The predecessor of the G4 program, the G3 program, was in-
troduced in the NFL in response to the Stadium Financing and
Franchise Relocation Act of 1999.128  When an NFL team plays an
away game at another team’s stadium, the visiting team is entitled
to receive a portion of the home team’s ticket sales revenue.129  The
G3 program operated by retaining a portion of the visiting teams’
share of revenue and placing it into a league fund that was used
solely for construction and renovation projects.130
Although the G4 program is relatively new, its structure and
purpose is similar to that of the G3 program, under which several
franchises successfully obtained loans from the NFL to provide a
portion of the capital required for stadium construction.131  The
benefit of this type of league-funded loan is that it partially offsets a
portion of the funding that is usually obtained through public
sources.132  By utilizing the G4 program, less reliance is placed on
public funding for stadium construction or improvements.133
Additionally, the G4 program provides teams with an immedi-
ate source of capital.134  Although the benefit of a G4 loan has yet
to be realized by an NFL team, the immediate access to capital is
what influenced the Minnesota Vikings to consider borrowing
funds from the G4 program to construct a new stadium.135  In the
128. See Greenberg, supra note 13, at 394-95 (summarizing Stadium Financing R
and Relocation Act of 1999 and explaining that Act required NFL “to make availa-
ble to a local government entity upon request from the amounts in the trust fund,
assistance for the cost of construction or renovation of playing facilities to be used
by a member club in that league, up to a maximum of one-half of that cost”).
129. See Bills Won’t Bend on TV Blackout Issue, BUSINESS FIRST (July 13, 2012,
1:27 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/news/2012/07/13/bills-wont-
bend-on-tv-blackout-issue.html?page=all (explaining that share of visiting team rev-
enue is typically 34 percent of ticket sales).
130. See Goodman, supra note 73, at 220 (explaining how G3 program created R
pool of revenue “for the express purpose of constructing football stadiums”).
131. See Jackson, supra note 125 (stating that new G4 loan program provides R
for up to $200 million loan for new stadium, $50 million more than G3 program);
see also Daniels, supra note 83, at 148 (explaining that as of 2003, the G3 program R
“has awarded $650 million out of a possible $800 million . . . to fortunate recipi-
ents in Boston/New England, Chicago, and Green Bay among others”).
132. See Daniels, supra note 83, at 148 (explaining that “the G3 loan pro- R
gram . . . allow[s] elected officials to incur less debt on behalf of the cities because
the G3 loans are reimbursed out of visiting teams’ ticket revenues”).
133. See id. (noting that by providing additional private source of financing,
G3 loan allowed hosting municipalities to incur less debt).
134. For a further discussion of advantages to G4 program, see infra notes
135-137 and accompanying text. R
135. See Tom Pelissero, Vikings Lobbying Owners, Meet With Chair of NFL Finance
Committee, ESPN TWIN CITIES (Apr. 2012), http://m.1500espn.com/pages/sports
wire.php?sID=4394 (stating that “[t]he Vikings have pledged $427 million towards
the upfront costs of the $975 million project.  That contribution is expected to
21
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spring of 2012, the Vikings planned to use the G4 program to bor-
row $200 million, the full amount allowable under the program for
new stadium construction.136  The loan program allows for the loan
to be repaid through premium seating revenue paid over a term of
fifteen years, making its terms attractive to a team, such as the Vik-
ings, in need of immediate capital to finance its stadium project.137
Despite its apparent benefits, a G4 loan may not be a viable
option for every team.138  The G4 program requires an NFL team to
contribute its own funds toward the stadium construction or reno-
vation cost in order to receive G4 funds.139  The loan is essentially a
matching agreement, stipulating that an NFL franchise may receive
funding from the NFL only up to the amount that the franchise
itself contributes.140  Thus, a team lacking sufficient cash to contrib-
ute to the cost of construction or renovation would be denied the
full benefits of a G4 loan.141  Moreover, the new G4 program places
a cap on NFL funding at $200 million for new stadium projects and
$250 million for stadium renovation projects.142
include a loan of up to $200 million under the NFL’s G4 program that would be
repaid through revenue from premium seating revenues normally shared among
the other 31 teams.”).
136. See id. (indicating that Minnesota Vikings plan to enter into $200 million
loan agreement with NFL).
137. See Jackson, supra note 125 (finding that new G4 loan program provides R
up to $200 million in loans for new stadium to be repaid with fifteen years of
premium seating revenue).
138. For a further discussion of constraints on teams’ access to G4 loans, see
infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. R
139. See 2011 Resolution G-4, Section 1, available at http://media.signonsandi-
ego.com/news/documents/2011/12/14/NFL_on_its_new_stadium_loan_pro-
gram.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (providing 2011 G-4 Resolution, which states in
relevant part, “[t]hat for any stadium construction project (new stadium or sta-
dium renovation costs of which will exceed $50 million) involving a private invest-
ment for which an affected club or its affiliated stadium entity (“Developing Club”)
makes a binding commitment, [the NFL] shall provide funding . . . of up to $200
million in the aggregate to the Developing Club [and up to $250 million for sta-
dium renovation] to support such project based on the amount that the Develop-
ing Club has committed or that will be applied to such project . . . ” through the
issuance of equity, PSL proceeds, or club seat premiums).
140. See Tim Graham, Sen. Charles Schumer’s Letter to Roger Goodell, THE BUFFALO
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012), http://blogs.buffalonews.com/press-coverage/2012/08/
charles-schumers-letter-to-roger-goodell.html (detailing Senator Charles Schu-
mer’s letter to Roger Goodell within which Mr. Schumer states, “[G4] program
could be of tremendous benefit to the Buffalo Bills and local taxpayers because it
would match any stadium investment the Bills make between $25M and the total
costs of renovations”).
141. See id. (noting that G4 program requires franchise to make investment in
stadium matching G4 loan amount).
142. See Jackson, supra note 125 (stating that new G4 loan program provides R
for up to $200 million loan for new stadium and up to $250 million for stadium
renovation to be repaid over fifteen years through premium seating revenue).
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2. Contribution From the NFL Franchise Itself
A recent trend in financing professional sports stadium con-
struction is the fusion of public and private funding.143  This fusion
is what funded the two most recent NFL stadiums, Cowboys Sta-
dium in Arlington, Texas and MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford,
New Jersey.144  Construction of Cowboys Stadium cost approxi-
mately $1.2 billion.145  Roughly two-thirds of the total stadium con-
struction cost was financed privately, including a $525 million
contribution from the Dallas Cowboys franchise itself and a $150
million loan from the NFL’s G3 program.146  MetLife Stadium was
financed entirely by private sources, including a $300 million loan
from the G3 loan program.147
Notwithstanding the construction of Cowboys Stadium and
MetLife Stadium, projects financed through a majority of private
funding remain the exception to stadium financing in the NFL, not
the trend.148  Moreover, these exceptions are likely particular to
Cowboys Stadium and MetLife stadium because they are home to
three of the most valuable franchises in the NFL.149  Other recent
143. See Frey, supra note 21, at 264 (revealing that “[a]lthough some stadiums R
are financed entirely with public money, a recent trend is toward mixed financing
and ownership with a combination of public and private funding”).
144. See Taking a Look at New and Remodeled NFL Stadiums, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 20, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/football/professional/
taking-a-look-at-new-and-remodeled-nfl-stadiums/article_c4769793-55f4-58f8-9de5-
fdeaa9fb07a3.html (summarizing costs and sources of financing for Cowboys Sta-
dium and MetLife Stadium).
145. See id. (detailing that “[a]bout two-thirds of construction costs were paid
with private money –  $525 million from the team, which also borrowed $150 mil-
lion from the NFL.  For the public portion, voters in Arlington passed a $325 mil-
lion bond issue that raised the city’s sales, hotel-occupancy and car-rental taxes.
Additional financing comes from ticket and parking taxes levied in and around the
stadium.”).
146. See id. (indicating that Dallas Cowboys franchise contributed $525 mil-
lion toward construction of Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas).
147. See id. (revealing that “Giants and Jets split cost, with help of $300 million
loan from NFL.  The teams, however, got free land for the stadium, which also gets
a break on property taxes.”); see also Jaboner Jackson, Stadium Geek Week: G3 Financ-
ing, FOOTBALLPHDS.COM, (July 19, 2011), http://www.footballphds.com/2011/07/
19/stadium-geek-week-g3-financing/ [hereinafter Jackson II] (stating that
“[u]nder the last iteration of G3 financing, each team was eligible for up to $150
million in G3 financing.  Accordingly, [MetLife] Stadium received $300 million
since the stadium had two teams, the New York Giants and New York Jets.”).
148. For a further discussion of other recent stadium projects that received
majority of financing from public as opposed to private sources, see supra note 65 R
and accompanying text.
149. See Mike Ozanian, Cowboys Most Valuable Team, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/ [hereinafter Ozanian II] (ranking Dallas
Cowboys as most valuable NFL team, New York Giants as fourth most valuable NFL
team, and Jets as sixth most valuable NFL team).
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stadium construction projects provide a more representative por-
trayal of the balance typically struck between public and private
financing.150
The construction of Lucas Oil Stadium in Indianapolis, Indi-
ana and the renovation of Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Mis-
souri were completed in 2008 and 2011, respectively and relied
significantly, but secondarily, on private financing.151  In 2008, the
Indianapolis Colts constructed the $720 million Lucas Oil Sta-
dium.152  Eighty-six percent of the construction costs came from
public funds, generated by increases in restaurant, car rental, and
hotel taxes, among other sources.153  The Colts franchise contrib-
uted only $100 million to the $720 million stadium.154  In 2011, the
Kansas City Chiefs completed a $388 million renovation to Arrow-
head Stadium.155  The Chiefs contributed $125 million, or approxi-
mately thirty-two percent of the total renovation cost.156  The
remaining cost of $263 million, or sixty-eight percent of the renova-
tion cost, was publicly financed through a 0.375 percent county
sales tax increase and a state tax credit.157
In early 2012, the San Francisco Forty-Niners entered into an
agreement with the City of Santa Clara, California to construct a
new stadium.158  The estimated cost of building the new stadium
was $1.18 billion, including up to $878 million in public funds, or
150. See Recent NFL Stadiums, supra note 65 (detailing public funding sources R
for recent NFL stadium improvements and constructions).
151. See id. (indicating that Lucas Oil Stadium was constructed with eighty-six
percent public financing and Arrowhead Stadium was renovated with sixty-eight
percent public financing).
152. See id. (referencing that Lucas Oil Stadium was constructed in 2008 at
total cost of $719.6 million).
153. See id. (noting that public financing included following sources: “3%
Marion County hotel tax increase, 2% County car rental tax increase, 1% County
restaurant tax increase, 1% County admissions tax increase, 1% Increases in res-
taurant taxes in six other counties, [and] Sales of Colts license plates”).
154. See id. (showing $100 million total private contribution toward funding
of Lucas Oil Stadium Renovations).
155. See id. (indicating that Arrowhead Stadium was renovated in 2011 at total
cost of $388.4 million).
156. See id. (showing $125 million total private contribution toward funding
of Arrowhead Stadium renovations).
157. See id. (noting that public financing included 0.375 percent county sales
tax increase and sales tax credit).
158. See San Francisco 49ers Football Stadium in the City of Santa Clara, CITY OF
SANTA CLARA, http://santaclaraca.gov/index.aspx?page=1197 (last visited Jan. 9,
2013) (stating that on February 14, 2012, City of Santa Clara “[a]pproved the De-
sign-Build Agreement with Turner Devcon Joint Venture and Forty-Niners Sta-
dium, LLC for construction of a professional football stadium, and approved the
Construction Agency Agreement with Forty-Niners Stadium, LLC for administra-
tion and management of stadium construction”).
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approximately seventy-three percent of the total construction cost,
earmarked for allocation to the stadium project.159  Interestingly,
the agreement included language stating that the Forty-Niners were
to cover any cost over-runs above the $878 million public funding
budget, which proved beneficial to the municipality because the es-
timated cost of construction increased after the parties entered into
agreement.160
It should be noted, however, that the Forty-Niners experienced
early complications in obtaining some of the funding allocated to
the stadium construction under the agreement.161  In June 2012,
Santa Clara County withheld $30 million in public funding
earmarked for stadium construction and reallocated the $30 mil-
lion for use in various public services.162  This resulted in the Forty-
Niners filing a lawsuit against Santa Clara County, which remained
unsettled as of December 2012.163
While there is no exact formula for determining the ratio of
private to public stadium construction financing, recent projects
have relied significantly, albeit not primarily, on private financial
sources.164  This means that NFL franchises are obtaining and con-
159. See Carolyn Schuk, Stadium Agreement Cost Protections Already Paying Off for
Santa Clara, THE SANTA CLARA WEEKLY (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.santaclara
weekly.com/2012/Issue-11/city_desk.html (stating that “it seems that the city’s
elected officials and staff scored a public interest touchdown with a provision that
the football team cover any stadium construction overruns (over $878 million).
This was one of the requirements of Measure J, the referendum approving stadium
development.”).
160. See id. (indicating that provision requiring Forty-Niners to cover cost
overruns quickly paid off because, “[t]he final stadium development budget and
financing plan presented to the Santa Clara City Council/Stadium Authority
(SA) . . . detailed $29 million in additional construction costs, $78 million for loan
interest and fees, and $50 million in contingency funds for unforeseen costs and
technology upgrades”).
161. See Lauren Hepler, 49ers, Santa Clara Schools Back In Limbo Over $30 Mil-
lion In Public Funds, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Dec. 19, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.
bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2012/12/19/exclusive-49ers-santa-clara-schools.
html (reporting that “[t]he new legal action by the 49ers continues a lawsuit first
filed in June, when the county took issue with a voter-approved plan to allocate $40
million in former redevelopment taxes to the team’s $1.2 billion Santa Clara sta-
dium project”).
162. See id. (reporting that Santa Clara County wished to take $30 million in
public funding originally included as part of Santa Clara’s contribution toward
new stadium and reallocate it for use by Santa Clara public schools).
163. See id. (noting that as of December 19, 2012, “[t]he San Francisco 49ers
and Santa Clara public schools will have to wait a little longer to learn whether
they’ll actually get their agreed-upon share of more than $30 million in public
funds that has been in dispute for months”).
164. For a further discussion and analysis of recent NFL stadium projects,
including average ratio of public versus private funding used to finance NFL stadi-
ums from 1997-2011, see supra note 123 and accompanying text. R
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tributing at least a portion of the capital used for construction or
renovation projects by securing financing through non-public or
private sources.165  For a team considering a G4 loan, an NFL team
can only utilize the G4 loan program if the team itself makes a capi-
tal contribution toward the construction or renovations.166  This
may incentivize a team to contribute a portion of their own capital
toward the construction or renovation of a stadium, especially if a
team is located in a municipality that is unwilling or unable to pro-
vide enough public financing to satisfy a team’s capital needs.167
3. Other Sources of Private Funding
There are several other sources of private and quasi-private
funding that can be employed in concert to provide stadium financ-
ing.168  One financing option commonly used by NFL teams is per-
sonal seat licenses (PSLs).169  When PSLs are used, fans essentially
pay for the right to purchase season tickets for a specific seat in the
stadium.170  The PSL does not include a ticket to attend the game;
the ticket must be purchased separately.171  The success of PSLs var-
ies with the overall success and popularity of the corresponding
NFL franchise.172  The resale market for PSLs indicates this varying
165. See Frey, supra note 21, at 264 (revealing that “a recent trend is [in sta- R
dium construction and renovation emphasizes] mixed financing . . . with a combi-
nation of public and private funding”).
166. See 2011 Resolution G-4, supra note 139 (revealing that new G4 loan pro- R
gram provides for up to $200 million loan for new stadium and up to $250 million
for stadium renovation to be repaid over fifteen years through premium seating
revenue; additionally, G4 program requires NFL franchise to contribute toward
cost of stadium construction or renovation).
167. See id. (noting that G4 program requires franchise to match G4 loan
amount).
168. For a further discussion of examples of alternative sources of stadium
financing by private and quasi-private sources, see infra notes 169-193 and accom- R
panying text.
169. See Tom Barlow, Sports Biz: Personal Seat Licenses are a License to Print
Money, DAILYFINANCE (May 17, 2009), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/05/17/
sports-biz-personal-seat-licenses-are-a-license-to-print-money/ (explaining that
“[w]hen [someone] buy[s] a personal seat license (PSL) for a stadium or arena,
[one] buy[s] the rights to a specific seat; say section 32, seat 3B.  With this comes
the right to buy the ticket for [one’s] seat for any public event that is held there.  If
[the person] decline[s], the venue can still sell the ticket to someone else, and
they don’t have to share the money with [the PSL owner].”).
170. See id. (providing that PSLs provide for sale of rights to select stadium
seating).
171. See id. (explaining that if PSL owner “decide[s] to attend an event, [one
must] still . . . pay for the ticket.  The PSL simply gives [one] the option to buy the
ticket before it is offered to the public.”).
172. See id. (explaining that value of PSLs on secondary market varies
markedly).
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success; PSLs for teams such as the Dallas Cowboys and the Pitts-
burgh Steelers are advertised on resale websites, such as eBay, for
tens of thousands of dollars.173  In contrast, PSLs for teams such as
the Cincinnati Bengals are being resold for only hundreds of
dollars.174
The sale of stadium naming rights is another source of revenue
for NFL teams.175  Recently, the New York Giants and the New York
Jets, which share a stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey, sold the
naming rights to their new stadium to MetLife for approximately
$17 million per year for twenty-five years.176  Although MetLife Sta-
dium provides an example of an exceptionally lucrative naming
rights deal, several stadiums around the league have similarly ob-
tained significant revenue from stadium naming rights deals.177
The downside of selling stadium naming rights is that it may take a
while to find a buyer who meets or comes close to meeting the
team’s asking price.178  For instance, Cowboys Stadium in Arling-
173. See id. (indicating that “[t]he resale market on PSLs is extremely volatile,
and dependent largely on the success of the sports franchises that play in the
venue.  On eBay [in May 2009] you could buy eight Dallas Cowboy PSLs for
$160,000 or two for the Pittsburgh Steelers for $60,000.”).
174. See id. (contrasting PSLs for Cowboys and Steelers with Cincinnati Ben-
gals and observing that two PSLs for Bengals can be bought for under $500).
175. See Frey, supra note 21, at 267 (recognizing that “[t]he sale of naming R
rights represents a major source of funding , as evidenced by the recent renaming
of stadiums to Invesco Field, Pepsi Center, Heinz Field, and Busch Stadium”).
176. See Mike Ozanian, Old Trafford’s Naming Rights Could Fetch $1 Billion For
Manchester United’s Shareholders, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/mikeozanian/2012/08/11/old-traffords-naming-rights-could-fetch-1-billion-
for-manchester-uniteds-shareholders/ [hereinafter Ozanian III] (reporting that
several U.S. sports teams have sold naming rights to their stadiums, and that nam-
ing rights for MetLife stadium sold for approximately $17 million per year for
twenty-five years).
177. See Jaboner Jackson, Stadium Geek Week: NFL Stadium Naming Rights, FOOT-
BALLPHDS.COM (July 20, 2011), http://www.footballphds.com/2011/07/20/sta-
dium-geek-week-nfl-stadium-naming-rights/ [hereinafter Jackson III] (providing
list of recent stadium naming rights deals and revenues).  This article contains the
following list of stadium naming rights deals:
Houston Texans, Reliant Stadium; $300 million, 30 yrs.,
Washington Redskins, FedEx Field; $207 million, 27 yrs.,
Arizona Cardinals, Univ. of Phoenix Stadium; $154 million, 20 yrs.,
Carolina Panthers, Bank of America Stadium; $140 million, 20 yrs.,
Philadelphia Eagles, Lincoln Financial Field; $140 million, 20 yrs.,
Indianapolis Colts, Lucas Oil Stadium; $122 million, 20 yrs.,
Denver Broncos, Invesco Field at Mile High; $120 million, 20 yrs.,
New England Patriots, Gillette Stadium; $115 million, 15 yrs.,
Baltimore Ravens, M&T Bank Stadium; $75 million, 15 yrs.
See id. (listing specified stadium rights deals).
178. See Darren Heitner, Why Jerry Jones Still Hasn’t Sold Naming Rights to Cow-
boys Stadium, FORBES.COM (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheit-
ner/2012/11/09/why-jerry-jones-still-hasnt-sold-naming-rights-to-cowboys-
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ton, Texas, had yet to sell the naming rights to its four-year-old sta-
dium in 2012.179
Furthermore, lottery funds may be used to finance a stadium
project.180  M&T Bank Stadium in Baltimore, Maryland utilized
debt service paid by lottery proceeds.181  Proponents of this ap-
proach argue that lottery funds do not burden taxpayers because
the purchase of lottery tickets is voluntary.182  Opponents express
concern that this approach disproportionately places the burden of
payment on economically disadvantaged individuals because they
are more likely to purchase lottery tickets.183  Moreover, the lottery
approach may displace lottery revenue used for other public bene-
fit programs and cause these other public benefit programs to lose
revenue.184
Similarly, a portion of state received income from casino reve-
nue could be siphoned off and dedicated to stadium financing.185
In early 2012, the Minnesota Vikings contemplated the use of funds
generated from a “racino,” a racetrack with machine gambling facil-
ities, to finance a portion of the cost to build a new stadium.186
stadium/ (noting situation with Cowboys Stadium and explaining that “[a]t first
thought, one may believe that [Jerry Jones, owner of Dallas Cowboys,] is throwing
away money by not selling his stadium’s naming rights, but selling the naming
rights to the wrong business could hurt the Cowboys’ revenue stream over time.
While acquiring naming rights appears to be a fairly easy and straight forward
process, the professional franchise must perform proper due diligence before sell-
ing the stadium’s naming rights to just any corporation.  This is because partner
corporations have either gone bankrupt in the past or have acquired a poor repu-
tation in the public’s eyes.”).
179. See Mitchell Schnurman, What’s In a Name for Cowboys Stadium, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/columnists/
mitchell-schnurman/20121001-whats-in-a-name-for-cowboys-stadium.ece (report-
ing that as of October 2012, Dallas Cowboys had not sold naming rights to Cow-
boys Stadium, which could be worth $15 to $20 million per year).
180. See Goodman, supra note 73, at 196 (introducing use of lottery funds as R
financing option).
181. See id. (explaining that Baltimore Ravens used lottery funds to partially
finance Ravens Stadium).
182. See id. (noting that taxpayer decision to purchase or not purchase lottery
tickets is voluntary).
183. See id. (reasoning that “lower-income earners tend to spend more of
their income on the lottery than do higher-income earners”).
184. See id. at 197 (explaining that strain will be placed on programs previ-
ously receiving lottery funds because money will be diverted from established
funds when new stadium fund is created).
185. See Mike Kaszuba & Jim Ragsdale, Racinos, St. Paul Add Stadium Drama,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Apr. 26, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.startrib-
une.com/politics/statelocal/148984435.html?refer=y (reporting that proposal for
new Minnesota Vikings stadium authorized use of “racinos” to generate funding).
186. See Briana Bierschbach, Pulltabs’ Cash Lag No Problem, For Now, POLITICS IN
MINNESOTA (Dec. 21, 2012), http://politicsinminnesota.com/2012/12/pulltabs-
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While this is controversial, especially for a state that has not author-
ized slot machines at the state’s horse racing tracks, it does show
that NFL franchises and their housing municipalities are starting to
devise increasingly creative solutions to obtain the necessary financ-
ing for stadium construction and renovation.187
Fusion of various private funding sources provides another al-
ternative.188  In Green Bay, several financing strategies were used in
conjunction, furthering the idea that utilizing several different
sources of financing can generate a substantial amount of fund-
ing.189  For example, the Green Bay Packers raised ticket prices by
ten percent and sold personalized bricks outside of the stadium.190
The bricks generated over $1 million in the first year of sale
alone.191  While Green Bay enjoyed exceptional success with these
brick sales, other NFL franchises have sold comparable amounts of
bricks in or around their stadiums.192  All sources of financing
should be considered by a team looking to construct or renovate a
stadium; like the personalized bricks utilized in Green Bay, each of
these sources of financing should effectively be viewed as building
blocks, the totality of which could provide an apt solution for a
team and its housing municipality to fund stadium construction or
renovations.193
cash-lag-no-problem-for-now/ (reporting that in Minnesota, “the Gambling Con-
trol Board [pursued] a number of different avenues to increase revenue. . . .
[T]he board approved new vendors of e-pulltabs and another electronic bingo
game.  Previously only one company had been authorized to sell the games.  The
board also gave the OK for bars at the Minneapolis St. Paul International Airport
(MSP) to start using the games.”).
187. See Kaszuba & Ragsdale, supra note 185 (reporting that legalizing R
“racino[s] has long been debated at the state Capitol, but has generally been op-
posed by DFLers and Indian tribes who operate casinos in Minnesota”).
188. For a further discussion of other private sources used in conjunction, see
infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text. R
189. For a further discussion of strategies employed by Green Bay Packers to
raise funding for stadium renovations through private sources, see infra notes 190- R
193 and accompanying text. R
190. See Frey, supra note 21, at 276 (explaining that face value of all admission R
tickets were increased by 10 percent and personalized bricks and tiles were sold to
be used around stadium).
191. See id. (noting that personalized bricks placed in and around Lambeau
Field generated approximately $1 million in first year alone).
192. See id. (explaining that while some cities had more success than others
selling bricks, Detroit also enjoyed success with brick sales, selling only a couple
thousand less bricks than Green Bay ).
193. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text (explaining that every R
source of financing should be examined even if anticipated revenue stream from
source will not finance entire stadium project in and of itself); see also supra notes
190-191 (indicating Green Bay Packers’ success with novel idea that not only fos- R
tered fan support, but provided financing for stadium renovations as well).
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C. Paying For the Bills
In the fall of 2012, it was evident that several issues needed to
be addressed before the Bills and Erie County could reach a new
lease agreement.194  While there was some discussion as to the pos-
sibility of constructing a new stadium for the Bills in downtown Buf-
falo, this initiative did not gain much support from government
officials who realized a new stadium would require a hefty invest-
ment of taxpayer funds.195  Much of the discourse surrounding the
new lease agreement centered on making the necessary renovations
to Ralph Wilson Stadium within a budget of approximately $200
million.196  If the plan was to proceed with the proposed renova-
tions to the stadium, the two parties needed to resolve what per-
centage of the investment in stadium renovations should be borne
by public sources, the taxpayers of Erie County and New York State,
and what percentage should be paid by private sources, such as the
Bills’ franchise, or the NFL through the G4 loan program.197
1. Public Sources For Financing Improvements
Public financing is a major issue underlying the striking of a
new lease agreement for the Buffalo Bills.198  After the expiration of
the Bills’ first lease agreement in 1998, substantial renovations were
194. See Heaney, supra note 4 (listing several major issues that must be ad- R
dressed before new agreement is reached between parties).
195. See James Fink, Bills, Sabres Execs Talk Development, BUFFALO BUSINESS FIRST
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/news/2012/08/16/bills-
sabres-execs-talk-development.html?page=all (reporting that Bills’ CEO Russ Bran-
don “said the Bills will take a ‘very holistic’ approach to whether the stadium
should be renovated and, at what level and cost, or should it be replaced with a
downtown Buffalo facility”); see also Some Argue for New Stadium Instead of Renovations
to Ralph Wilson Stadium, DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.
democratandchronicle.com/article/20120810/SPORTS03/120810002/Some-ar-
gue-new-stadium-instead-renovations-Ralph-Wilson-Stadium (revealing that while
some people argue that building new stadium would be better option as opposed
to renovations, Erie County Executive Mark Polocarz ruled this out due to con-
cerns over “cost and space”).
196. See Matt Rich Warren, Buffalo Bills Stadium Renovations Expected To Top
$200 Million, BUFFALO RUMBLINGS (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.buffalorumblings.
com/2012/4/15/2949966/buffalo-bills-ralph-wilson-stadium-renovations (stating
that Bills’ CEO Russ Brandon “put aside” idea to build new stadium based on “lo-
gistical concerns of cost” and Mr. Brandon focused attention on renovations to
Ralph Wilson Stadium, which were expected to cost upwards of $200 million).
197. See Heaney, supra note 4 (explaining that one major issue that must be R
addressed in reaching agreement is percentage allocation of stadium renovation
costs).
198. See id. (introducing question of how much of cost for renovations to
Ralph Wilson Stadium should be borne by New York State taxpayers); see also Gee,
supra note 8 (explaining that Bills expect state and local government to contribute R
substantial amount of funding to pay for renovations to Ralph Wilson Stadium).
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made to Ralph Wilson Stadium.199  These renovations cost $63 mil-
lion, the entirety of which was provided by a state public subsidy.200
Under the stadium lease agreement executed in 1998, the Bills also
received substantial public funding for stadium operating costs.201
According to a local news source, the 1998 agreement provided for
“more in operating subsidies ($111 million) than in capital costs
($101 million).”202  With a strong history of providing large
amounts of public funding to support to the Buffalo Bills, it may be
expected that the new lease agreement will place a significant em-
phasis on funding stadium renovation through taxpayer money.203
There are several ways by which the Bills can generate revenue
through public funding.204  First, it is expected that Erie County
and New York State will directly subsidize a substantial portion of
the stadium renovation cost with taxpayer funds.205  Issuing tax-free
municipal bonds is the most likely way for Erie County and New
York State to fund such a subsidy.206  Other public subsidy options
include offering the stadium various forms of tax relief or tax ex-
199. See Matt Rich Warren, Buffalo Bills Stadium Upgrades Could Be Partly Funded
By Team, League, BUFFALO RUMBLINGS (June 22, 2012), http://www.buffalo
rumblings.com/2012/6/22/3110468/buffalo-bills-stadium-upgrades-lease-ralph-
wilson [hereinafter Warren II] (reporting that “[l]ocal and state government paid
the entire $63 million renovation price tag in 1998”).
200. See id. (noting that all $63 million in renovations to Ralph Wilson Sta-
dium were paid by public funding); see also Gaughan, supra note 26 (reporting that R
“the state will be asked to fund the public-sector share of the major renovations, as
it did 15 years ago”).
201. See Heaney, supra note 4 (arguing that public currently pays for $111 R
million of Bills’ operating costs over fifteen year term of lease).
202. See id. (revealing amounts of public subsidy Erie County and New York
State currently provides to Bills for operating costs, first published in Buffalo
News).
203. See Warren II, supra note 199 (reporting that renovations made to Ralph R
Wilson Stadium in 1998 were paid for entirely by state and local government); see
also Heaney, supra note 4 (indicating amount of subsidy New York State and Erie R
County provide to Bills for operating costs); see also Gaughan, supra note 26 (re- R
porting that Bills expect state and local governments to pay for most of required
stadium renovations).
204. For a further discussion of the public sources of financing for NFL sta-
dium renovation or construction, see supra notes 65-120 and accompanying text. R
205. See Gee, supra note 10 (reporting that protection of taxpayer funds will R
be essential under new lease).  Erie County and New York State are being asked to
provide two to three times as much money required by stadium improvements
almost fifteen years ago. See id. (recognizing that public is expected to subsidize
anywhere from $125 to $190 million of expected $200 to $220 million cost for
improvements).
206. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (analyzing direct public R
subsidies in form of municipal bonds to pay for stadium construction or
renovation).
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emptions, such as waiving the sales tax on construction materials
used for stadium improvements.207
Second, the Bills could reshape the way in which the public
perceives public funding for stadium improvements.208  Inevitably
some taxpayers will argue that they should not be obligated to subsi-
dize a facility used ten times a year, especially when that facility is
used by a profitable business that has the resources to pay for the
renovations itself.209  One taxpayer went so far as to create a website
dedicated to telling the taxpayers of western New York that subsi-
dizing the Buffalo Bills and Ralph Wilson Stadium was a losing com-
mitment for the western New York community.210
To counteract this perception, the subsidy could be shaped in
a way that uses the money that the Bills currently pay in New York
State payroll taxes to finance the debt incurred from improve-
ments.211  This is referred to as “payroll tax incremental financing”
and it would require Erie County and New York State to originally
issue debt in the form of municipal bonds to pay for the improve-
ments and then use the payroll taxes paid by the Bills to service the
debt.212  Over a fifteen-year lease term, $150 million in improve-
ments could be amortized by the Bills’ average payroll tax payments
of $13 million per year invested at 4 percent interest per year.213
While this strategy effectively creates a payroll tax exemption for
the Bills, some argue that if the Bills relocate, New York State would
not receive any tax revenue from the Bills.214  While this is still very
207. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (noting indirect public sub- R
sidies utilized by other NFL franchises).
208. See Rocco Termini, Another Voice: Creative Solution Could Solve Stadium Is-
sue, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.buffalonews.com/apps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20120917/OPINION/120919406/1074 (explaining possible so-
lution to financing stadium improvements that does not require immediate outlay
of taxpayer funds).
209. See Heaney, supra note 4 (recognizing that “[t]hose who say the taxpayer R
shouldn’t subsidize a facility used 10 times a year—and by extension a profitable
business worth hundreds of millions of dollars—have a valid point”).
210. See Goodbye Buffalo Bills, BYEBYEBUFFALOBILLS.COM, http://www.byebyebuf-
falobills.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (questioning whether government
should be “in the business of entertaining its citizens as opposed to educating
them, and providing other essential public programs and services that benefit area
residents”).
211. See Termini, supra note 208 (suggesting solution to financing stadium R
without immediate outlay of taxpayer funds).
212. See id. (presenting payroll tax incremental financing and relating it to
financing of renovations of Ralph Wilson Stadium).
213. See id. (explaining that “[o]ver the 15-year term of the lease, $13 million
a year in payments at 4 percent can amortize $150 million in improvements”).
214. See id. (recognizing that relocation of Bills franchise would result in loss
of money to state and local municipalities, and theorizing that “[i]f the Bills de-
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much a public subsidy, framing the subsidy as a payroll tax may
make it easier for the public to rationalize spending public funds to
subsidize a privately owned and highly profitable business
organization.215
Although payroll tax incremental financing could be successful
in western New York, other public financing options exist.216  One
possible solution would be to raise the sales tax rate in Erie County
to help pay for the renovation costs.217  However, the citizens of
Erie County are not likely to support a higher sales tax.218  Erie
County taxpayers already pay the second highest sales tax rates in
New York State at 8.75 percent, second only to New York City’s sales
tax rate of 8.875 percent.219
Moreover, public ownership of the Bills franchise also fails to
offer an appropriate solution.220  Public ownership would take sev-
eral years to implement, and may be impossible because the NFL
prohibits public ownership of NFL teams in its bylaws.221  Such by-
laws would have to be overturned either through NFL initiative or
cided that they wanted to leave, the penalty would be twice the investment in the
improvements”).  But see Neil deMause, Buffalo Residents: No Tax Money for Stadium
Buffalo Developer: Do We Have to Call It Tax Money?, FIELD OF SCHEMES (Sept. 18,
2012), http://www.fieldofschemes. com/2012/09/18/3800/buffalo-residents-no-
tax-money-for-stadium-buffalo-developer-do-we-have-to-call-it-tax-money/ (arguing
that “[t]ax increment financing projects (a.k.a. TIFs) have a long and sordid his-
tory in the U.S., particularly around sports facilities — the basic concept being that
if the sports team weren’t there, it wouldn’t be paying any taxes to the state, so it
should get its state taxes kicked back to pay for a new building”).
215. For a discussion of an alternative way to frame a public subsidy, see supra
notes 208-215 and accompanying text. R
216. For a discussion of why other methods of public financing for improve-
ments to Ralph Wilson Stadium are likely to be unsuccessful, see infra notes 218- R
213 and accompanying text. R
217. For a further discussion and analysis of how a sales tax increase can be
used to help finance stadium construction debt, see supra notes 85-96 and accom- R
panying text.
218. See Sales Tax Rates, RAND NEW YORK SALES TAX STATISTICS, http://ny.
rand.org/stats/govtfin/salestax.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (indicating sales
tax rate for counties in New York State).
219. See id. (indicating various sales tax rates of New York State municipalities,
including Erie County).
220. For a further discussion and analysis of public ownership as an alterna-
tive to fund Ralph Wilson Stadium renovation, see infra note 221 and accompany- R
ing text.
221. See Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, NFL.COM, http:/
/static.nfl.com/static/content//public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 7, 2013) (specifying under section 3.2(A) that “[n]o corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, or other entity not operated for profit nor any charitable
organization or entity not presently a member of the League shall be eligible for
membership”).
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litigation, a process that would itself take several years.222  The Bills
and Erie County do not have several years to remain idle in their
lease negotiations.223
Other public financing options may be used to generate fund-
ing for stadium renovations.224  Due to strained state and local
budgets in New York State, it would be difficult for Erie County to
reallocate funds from other public programs to help finance the
renovation of Ralph Wilson Stadium.225  However, other options
such as entertainment or sin taxes could provide the needed influx
of capital to contribute to the renovations.226
The agreement struck between the Forty-Niners and the City of
Santa Clara offers another alternative.227  As applied to the Bills,
Erie County should seek a provision in the new lease agreement
limiting the public’s contribution toward stadium renovations to
avoid construction overruns and encourage efficient planning and
oversight of the stadium renovations.228  Although such language
would not provide public financing in and of itself, it would effec-
tively protect taxpayers from costly overruns.229
2. Private Funding Through G4 Loan Program and Other Sources
In August of 2012, political leaders of Erie County and New
York State offered their support to help the Bills structure a new
222. For a discussion and analysis of the public ownership model as an alter-
native to provide funding for stadium construction or renovation, see supra notes
97-110 and accompanying text. R
223. See Brian Frederick, Fans List Demands for New NFL Labor Agreement, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-freder-
ick/fans-list-of-demands-for-_b_832050.html (recognizing NFL teams have been
known to relocate overnight, specifically recalling incident in 1984 when Baltimore
Colts relocated to Indianapolis overnight, noting that “[b]y the time the state had
passed legislation to seize the Colts, there was nothing left to seize”).
224. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text (exploring other options R
of public financing available to NFL teams).
225. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (examining redistribu- R
tion of funds from other public programs but indicating tight budget in New York
State in 2012).
226. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (exploring sin and R
amusement taxes as source of public funding for stadium construction or
renovation).
227. See Schuk, supra note 159 (discussing agreement entered into between R
City of Santa Clara and Forty-Niners capping public contribution for stadium
construction).
228. See id. (recognizing that City of Santa Clara benefited from provision due
to increase in estimated cost of stadium construction).
229. See id. (reporting that Forty-Niners and City of Santa Clara agreed to use
substantial amount of public funds, $878 million, to finance new stadium and not-
ing that limiting provision protects Santa Clara from paying more for stadium than
agreed upon).
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lease agreement to encourage the Bills to stay in Buffalo.230  New
York State Senator Charles Schumer held a conference on August
8, 2012 and revealed his plan to help the Bills, which emphasized
making use of the NFL’s G4 loan program.231  The New York state
senator proposed changes to the NFL’s G4 loan program that
would offer more favorable financing to the Bills if they decided to
borrow a G4 loan from the NFL to cover a portion of the renova-
tions to the stadium.232  Under the current terms of the G4 loan
agreement, if the Bills were to take out a loan from the NFL, the
terms of the loan would force the team to pay back the loan upon
the sale of the franchise.233  This sale would likely take place after
Ralph Wilson, Jr. passes away and the team is sold.234
During the same week in August 2012, New York governor An-
drew Cuomo hired Irwin Raij, an attorney who specializes in sta-
dium development projects and lease negotiations in an effort to
prevent the Bills from relocating and to ensure that taxpayer
money is not squandered.235  Meanwhile, NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell offered his insight, recognizing that it is crucial to
have a long-term lease that will address both short-term as well as
long-term stadium issues and help ensure that the Bills are success-
ful in Buffalo.236
Based on recent trends in NFL stadium renovation and con-
struction projects, the Bills may be expected to contribute at least a
230. See Graham, supra note 56 (writing that NFL Commissioner Roger Good- R
ell emphasized that “people want the Bills to stay [in Buffalo], a new stadium lease
is ‘a very high priority,’ and the team will be sold after Ralph Wilson dies”); see also
Gov. Appoints Expert to Advise, supra note 56 (stating that New York State Governor R
Andrew Cuomo and New York State Senator Charles Schumer offered their sup-
port to help keep Bills in Buffalo and facilitate lease negotiations between Bills and
Erie County).
231. See Gov. Appoints Expert to Advise, supra note 56 (reporting that in August R
2012, New York State Senator Charles Schumer sought changes to NFL loan pro-
gram to find solution to keep Bills in Buffalo).
232. See id. (reporting that Senator Charles Schumer spoke with Roger Good-
ell on August 8, 2012, specifically requesting that some terms of NFL’s G4 loan
program be changed or waived for Bills so that Bills franchise could take advantage
of G4 loan).
233. See id. (specifying that Senator Charles Schumer requested “‘[the] due
on sale’ clause in the NFL’s G4 loan program be waived for teams that have had
the same owner for at least 20 years”).
234. See id. (stating that “[the due on sale] clause requires owners to fully
repay the loans if the team is sold”).
235. See id, (reporting on New York State governor Andrew Cuomo’s involve-
ment in lease negotiations and his intention to help prevent Bills franchise from
relocating).
236. See id. (reporting on NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s involvement in
lease negotiations and his emphasis on helping both parties reach short-term as
well as long-term solution to stadium issues in Buffalo).
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portion of the financing for stadium improvements.237  It can be
shown that in recent years NFL teams have made at least some in-
vestment toward stadium improvements.238  Additionally, an invest-
ment by the Bills is necessary in order for the team to take
advantage of the G4 loan for which Senator Schumer advocated.239
Thus, the Bills will most likely make some capital contribution to-
ward the stadium renovation; the question becomes how much the
franchise will contribute.240  It remains apparent that a feasible and
fair financing solution for the renovations to Ralph Wilson Stadium
will require all affected parties and constituencies to contribute in a
meaningful way, including the Bills franchise itself.241
Other solutions of funding which would supplement private
sources include PSLs, stadium naming rights, lottery funds, and ca-
sino funds.242  While it is speculative as to whether some of these
measures would be successful in Buffalo, it is estimated that stadium
naming rights could bring in $4 million per year over a fifteen-year
lease term.243  If the lease agreement provides that this revenue
would be submitted to New York State in exchange for New York
State bearing the upfront cost of stadium improvements, the sta-
dium naming rights revenue stream of $4 million per year would
237. See Gee, supra note 10 (reporting that protection of taxpayer funds will R
be essential under new lease).  Erie County and New York State are being asked to
provide two to three times as much money required by stadium improvements
almost fifteen years ago, which would mean that the public is expected to subsidize
anywhere from $125 to $190 million of expected $200 to $220 million cost for
improvements. See id. (estimating State’s commitment at “two to three times” pre-
vious $63 million dollar earmark for renovations).  The Bills organization or an-
other private investor would likely pay the remainder of the cost. See id. (noting
Bills’ expectation of “somewhere between $200 million and $220 million in sta-
dium improvements”).
238. See supra notes 143-167 and accompanying text (providing analysis of R
contributions made by other NFL teams toward stadium construction or renova-
tion projects).
239. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (explaining requirements R
of NFL’s G4 loan program); see also supra notes 231-234 and accompanying text R
(revealing New York State Senator Charles Schumer’s plan to take advantage of
NFL G4 loan).
240. See supra notes 143-167 and 237 and accompanying text (revealing cir- R
cumstances indicating that Bills are expected to make some contribution toward
renovation of Ralph Wilson Stadium).
241. See Gee, supra note 10 (explaining that Bills are expected to put forth at R
least portion of financing for stadium renovations and that to take advantage of G4
loan program, Bills must make some contribution).
242. See supra notes 168-193 and accompanying text (analyzing other sources R
of private financing and quasi-private financing, including PSLs, stadium naming
rights, lottery funds, and casino funds).
243. See Termini, supra note 208 (explaining possible solution to financing R
stadium improvements that does not require taxpayer funds).
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allow New York State to borrow $45 million at four percent interest
for fifteen years to immediately finance a substantial portion of sta-
dium improvements.244
Conversely, PSLs are not likely to offer great success to stadium
financing in Buffalo.245  PSLs are often very successful for NFL
teams located in cities with big markets, but they are less successful
for teams located in smaller markets, such as the Buffalo Bills.246
Other options such as lottery or casino funds are worth considering
and could provide a necessary influx of capital to contribute to the
renovations.247  Even options such as selling Buffalo Bills license
plates or personalized bricks to be embedded in or around the sta-
dium could be used to generate revenue.248  For a franchise like the
Bills, no idea is too small or insignificant; every dollar worth of ex-
tra revenue is important.249
IV. NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENT AND REMEDIES AT LAW
AND IN EQUITY
A. Non-Relocation Agreements and Other Protections Utilized
by NFL Teams
A non-relocation agreement, including a penalty clause upon
relocation of an NFL franchise, can be a powerful tool for a city or
state to use to deter an NFL franchise from relocating.250  Houston,
Texas felt the effects of a team relocating to another city in 1996
when the Houston Oilers relocated to Tennessee and became the
244. See id. (noting that “[t]he Bills are . . . one of the [few] clubs in the NFL
that have not sold the naming rights to their stadium . . . .  [T]he Bills can sell the
naming rights for a minimum of $4 million per year over the 15-year lease period.
This revenue stream would allow the state to borrow $45 million at 4 percent over
15 years.”).
245. See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text (examining use of PSLs R
amongst NFL teams).
246. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text (explaining that PSLs are R
less effective when used in stadiums with small market teams); see also supra notes
57-58 and accompanying text (categorizing Buffalo Bills as small market team). R
247. See supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text (examining lottery and R
casino funds as sources of financing for stadium construction or renovation).
248. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text (examining personalized R
brick sales as sources of financing for stadium construction or renovation).
249. See Frey, supra note 21, at 276 (explaining that sources of funding that R
may seem insignificant are worth exploring).
250. See Non-Relocation Agreement By and Between Harris County Sports & Conven-
tion Corporation, and Houston NFL Holdings, L.P., HARRIS CNTY.-HOUSTON SPORTS
AUTH., http://www.houstonsports.org/downloads/1358605841.04093500_9f8679
3a61/non_relocation_agreement_02.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Houston Non-Relocation Agreement] (proving non-relocation agreement [“Agree-
ment”] for Houston Texans).
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Tennessee Titans.251  In 1999, Houston acquired an expansion
team, the Houston Texans (the “Texans”).252  In 2001, the Texans
entered into a non-relocation agreement (the “Agreement”) with a
government corporation formed to represent the City of Houston
(“Houston”), which was intended to deter subsequent relocation of
the Texans.253
The Agreement provided that the Texans were required to
play all of their home games “in the local area” and “in the Stadium
throughout the lease term.”254  The exception to this general provi-
sion was that one game per season could be played outside of the
area.255  The Agreement also provided exceptions for special cir-
cumstances such as untenantability of the stadium and obligations
during an NFL Labor Dispute.256
Because Houston lost an NFL franchise due to relocation once
before, it is no surprise that the Agreement specifically contem-
plated relocation.257  It provided that the Texans “shall not relocate
the Club or the Home Territory of the Club outside the boundaries
of the Local Area.”258  It further prohibited the Texans from seek-
ing approval from the NFL to relocate, except during the last five
years of the lease term.259  If the team were to entertain relocation
251. See Houston Oilers Historical Moments, SPORTS E-CYCLOPEDIA, http://www.
sportsecyclopedia.com/nfl/tenhou/houoilers.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (ex-
plaining that in 1996, Houston Oilers ended their lease with city of Houston one
year early and moved to Tennessee).
252. See Texans Team History, HOUSTON TEXANS, http://www.houstontexans.
com/team/history.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (noting that on October 6,
1999, “[t]he National Football League owners vote[d] 29-0 to award the 32nd NFL
franchise to Houston and Bob McNair for a record amount of $700 million”).
253. See Houston Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 250 (stating that non-re- R
location Agreement was entered into in May 2001 between local government,
through government corporation [“Houston”], and Houston Texans franchise
[the “Texans”]).
254. See id., Article 2 §§ 2.1 and 2.2.1 (committing Texans franchise to play in
local area and covenanting Texans to play in stadium).
255. See id. (indicating up to one Texans home football game may be played
outside of home stadium and local area, provided it is not playoff game).
256. See id. (discussing circumstances under which Texans would not be re-
quired to play in home stadium, including untenantability of stadium, casualty not
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct of Texans or its agents or employ-
ees, event of force majeure, landlord failure, landlord default, or during NFL labor
disputes).
257. See id., art. 3 (discussing terms in Agreement restricting relocation of
franchise).
258. See id., art. 3 § 3.1(a) (stating that Texans “shall not relocate the Club or
the Home Territory of the Club outside the boundaries of the Local Area”).
259. See id., art. 3 § 3.2 (providing that “except during last five (5) years of the
Lease Term,” Texans “shall not apply for or seek approval from the National Foot-
ball League for the relocation of the Club or the Home Territory of the Club
outside the Local Area or for the reduction of the Local Area”).
38
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/11
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS211.txt unknown Seq: 39 14-JUN-13 15:10
2013] WHO IS GOING TO PAY THE BILLS 701
offers during the last five years of the Agreement, the Agreement
makes it clear that the team must provide written notice to Hous-
ton.260  Additionally, the Texans cannot relocate before the expira-
tion of the current lease term.261
In the event of a default by the Texans, the Agreement in-
cluded specific remedies.262  In particular, Houston could seek and
obtain injunctive or declaratory relief including specific perform-
ance, recover liquidated damages, terminate the Agreement, and
utilize any other remedy available at law or in equity.263  Especially
noteworthy was the availability of specific performance as a rem-
edy.264  The Agreement recognized that Houston constructed the
stadium, incurred debt, and levied taxes to that end, and rational-
ized that monetary damages would be too indeterminate to com-
pensate Houston for any breach.265  It should be noted, however,
that this type of specific performance is subject to state and local
laws, and such specific performance must take several factors into
consideration, including public policy and practicability.266
The Agreement also contemplated liquidated damages.267  Al-
though the Agreement stated that there were “financial, civic, and
social benefits” from the Texans playing football in Houston, these
benefits were “difficult to quantify” precisely.268  However, the
Agreement stipulated a list of breach dates and corresponding sums
260. See id., art. 3 § 3.3 (providing that Texans must provide written notice of
negotiations or agreements with third parties concerning relocation).
261. See id. (stating relocation may not occur before expiration of current
lease term).
262. See id., art. 4 (explaining remedies available to non-breaching party).
263. See id., art. 4 § 4.2 (providing remedies to Houston in event of breach by
Texans).
264. See id. (providing specific performance as possible remedy to non-
breaching party).
265. See id., art. 4 § 4.3 (stating either party may seek injunctive relief and
recognizing that Houston incurred taxes and debt to “permit playing of Football
Home Games in the Stadium” and “damages could not be calculated to compen-
sate [Houston] . . . for any breach by [Texans] of the covenants and agreements
contained in [the] Non-Relocation Agreement”).
266. See id. (providing exceptions to equitable relief of specific performance).
267. See id., art. 4 § 4.4 (contemplating liquidated damages and providing
schedule of “reasonable estimated damages” not to be construed as penalty).
268. See id. (providing that “[p]arties also recognize, agree, and stipulate that
the financial, civic, and social benefits to HCSCC, the Sports Authority, the City,
and the County from the presence of the Club and the playing of its Football
Home Games in the Local Area are great, but that the precise value of those bene-
fits is difficult to quantify due to the number of citizens and businesses that rely
upon and benefit from the presence of the Club in the City and County”).
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of reasonable liquidated damages.269  For instance, the Agreement
provided for $200 million in liquidated damages for a breach of
contract during the first five years of the Agreement and the dam-
ages reduce to $60 million if a breach occurred after July 1, 2023.270
In the event that the Texans sell the franchise, the Agreement
considered assignment of the non-relocation clauses to the as-
signee.271  The agreement stated that the assignee becomes respon-
sible for the performance of all of the obligations agreed to by the
Texans under the Agreement.272  While the Agreement envisioned
many other assignment and transfer scenarios, it makes it clear that
the Texans may not sell the team to relocate the franchise without
being in breach of the agreement.273
The City of Santa Clara (“Santa Clara”) recently executed a
non-relocation agreement with the San Francisco Forty-Niners
prior to starting construction on a new stadium.274  This agreement
included provisions comparable to the provisions set forth in the
269. See id. (providing dates and amounts for liquidated damages after breach
of contract by Texans).
7/1/98-6/30/2003, $200,000,000;
7/1/03-6/30/2008, $172,000,000;
7/1/08-6/30/2013, $144,000,000;
7/1/13-6/30/2018, $116,000,000;
7/1/18-6/30/2023, $80,000,000;
After 7/1/2023, $60,000,000.
Id. (scheduling liquidated damages for breach of contract by Texans).
270. See id. (noting that breach of contract between June 1, 1998 and May 30,
2003 would result in $200 million in liquidated damages and breach between after
June 1, 2023 would result in $60 million in liquidated damages).
271. See id., Article 5 § 5.1(b) (stating that “[A]ssignee assumes full responsi-
bility for the performance of all of the obligations of [Texans] under this [agree-
ment] arising on and after the date of assignment”).
272. See id. (detailing that “such assignee of the Franchise executes and deliv-
ers to HCSCC Assignment and Assumption Agreement whereby such assignee as-
sumes full responsibility for the performance of all of the obligations of Houston
NFL Holdings under this Non-Relocation Agreement arising on and after the date
of such assignment.  The form of such instrument of assumption shall be subject to
the prior written approval of HCSCC, which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld, delayed or conditioned, and shall be limited to the question of whether
such instrument, when duly executed, will accomplish its intended purpose under
this Non-Relocation Agreement.”).
273. See generally id., Article 5 (providing permitted transfers, assignments, re-
lease from obligations, and other contemplated assignments).
274. See Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agreement, CITY OF SANTA CLARA, http://
santaclaraca.gov/modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=7039 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2012) (containing non-relocation agreement executed between Santa
Clara and Forty-Niners dated March 11, 2012); see also Katie Linendoll, 49ers’ New
Stadium Aims to Be Smartest, ESPN (Oct. 29, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://espn.go.com/
blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/2757/49ers-new-stadium-aims-to-be-smartest (re-
porting that new stadium for San Francisco Forty-Niners is scheduled to open in
2014).
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Houston non-relocation agreement.275  However, the default and
remedies section in the Santa Clara agreement contemplated spe-
cific performance more fully than the Houston agreement.276  The
Santa Clara agreement emphasized the possibility of specific per-
formance, injunctive relief, and other equitable remedies to be
used against the Forty-Niners in the event that the Forty-Niners
breached the agreement, by describing these remedies as a “bar-
gained-for expectation” of the agreement.277  Additionally, the liq-
uidated damages provision was more ambitious than the provision
in the Houston agreement.278  Instead of scheduling specific
amounts of damages to be sought in the event of a breach of con-
tract, the Santa Clara agreement provided that the Forty-Niners are
liable for “the outstanding principal, plus accrued interest, fees and
expenses on the Construction/Takeout Loan on the date of pay-
ment.”279  This language more effectively seeks to recover the Santa
Clara taxpayers’ investment in the new stadium by attempting to
275. Compare Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 274, §§ 2-5 (con- R
taining Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agreement, including covenant to play at new
stadium for specified term subject to several terms and conditions and providing
remedies for default), with Houston Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 250, §§ 2-5 R
(containing Houston Non-Relocation Agreement, including covenant to play at
new stadium for specified term subject to several terms and conditions and provid-
ing remedies for default).
276. See Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 274, § 5.1(b) (“[T]he R
specific performance of the Non-Relocation Covenants is a bargained-for expecta-
tion of the [City of Santa Clara] . . . .  [I]n the event of a Non-Relocation Default,
the [City of Santa Clara] shall be entitled as a form of relief to a judicial order and
judgment directing [the Forty-Niners] to specifically perform its obligations under
the Non-Relocation Covenants and enjoining it from failing to perform its obliga-
tions under the Non-Relocation Covenants or acting in a manner that would con-
stitute a Non-Relocation Default.”).
277. See id. § 5.1(c) (“[I]n the event of a Non-Relocation Default, the [City of
Santa Clara] shall . . . be entitled to seek and obtain . . . temporary, preliminary
and permanent injunctive and other equitable relief restraining, enjoining and
prohibiting any such Non-Relocation Default, and directing the specific perform-
ance of the terms of the Non-Relocation Covenants”).
278. Compare id. § 5.2(b) (“[The] team shall be liable for, and the Stadium
Authority shall have the right to recover from Team, liquidated damages in an
amount equal to the amount, if any, of the outstanding principal, plus accrued
interest, fees and expenses on the Construction/Takeout Loan on the date of pay-
ment . . . “), with Houston Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 250, Article 4 §4.4 R
(providing liquidated damages schedule that may or may not cover Houston’s in-
vestment in stadium constructed for Texans).
279. Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 274, § 5.2(b) (“[T]eam R
shall be liable for, and the Stadium Authority shall have the right to recover from
Team, liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount, if any, of the out-
standing principal, plus accrued interest, fees and expenses on the Construction/
Takeout Loan on the date of payment. . . .”).
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ensure that the City of Santa Clara is not left with any debt from
building a new stadium in the event of a Forty-Niners breach.280
Other NFL teams have entered agreements similar to the non-
relocation agreements utilized in Houston and Santa Clara.281  In
the fall of 2011, the Jacksonville Jaguars executed a lease agreement
which included provisions stating that the Jaguars may breach the
lease agreement without fault only if the stadium is improperly
maintained or if the team loses money in three consecutive years.282
This allowed Jacksonville to protect against franchise relocation be-
cause Jacksonville deemed neither of those possibilities as likely to
arise.283
Additionally, the NFL bylaws provide an added layer of protec-
tion from franchise relocation.284  Article 4.3 of the NFL bylaws
states that a franchise may relocate if it is no longer financially via-
ble and the NFL and the franchise cannot work together to find an
adequate solution.285  If there is no financial viability and the sides
cannot reach a solution, the NFL must then consider several factors
in determining whether to allow a team to relocate.286  Further-
280. See generally id. (providing comprehensive terms of liquidated damages
provision); see also Brian Shields, Santa Clara Council Approves Niners Stadium Con-
tract, KRON4 (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.kron4.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=3111
(providing that Santa Clara legislature approved contract to build new Forty-
Niners stadium at a cost of $878 million).
281. See Jaboner Jackson, NFL In LA: Jacksonville Jaguars Not Coming to Farmers
Field In Los Angeles, FOOTBALLPHDS.COM (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.footballphds.
com/2011/11/30/nfl-in-la-jacksonville-jaguars-not-coming-to-farmers-field-in-los-
angeles-2/ [hereinafter Jackson IV] (reporting that Jacksonville Jaguars have “iron-
clad” agreement in place).
282. See id. (noting that Jacksonville “Jaguars can only break their lease with-
out fault if a judge determines that the City of Jacksonville has not properly main-
tained the stadium or if the judge determines that the team has lost money for
three consecutive seasons.  And neither has been the case for the Jaguars.”).
283. See id. (noting that it was not likely for City of Jacksonville to neglect
stadium upkeep and it was not likely that Jaguars franchise would experience three
consecutive years of fiscal losses).
284. See id. (stating “the NFL has clear policies and procedures in place for
relocation” and describing factors NFL considers prior to relocation of franchise).
285. See id. (“[According to] Article 4.3 of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, a
franchise can relocate if a club’s viability in its current city and stadium cannot be
solved by the franchise and NFL working in conjunction.”).
286. See id. (revealing twelve factors NFL considers when determining
whether to approve or deny NFL franchise relocation).  The factors are listed as
follows:
(1) The team’s service to its current city and stadium;
(2) Fan loyalty;
(3) Stadium adequacy;
(4) Public financial support of the team by the city and taxpayers;
(5) Team’s financial performance;
(6) Whether there is already a team in the relocation city;
(7) Team’s attempt to address stadium situations in its current city;
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more, Article 4.3 “requires prior approval by the affirmative vote of
three-fourths of the member clubs before a club may transfer its
franchise or playing site to a different city either within or outside
its existing home territory.”287  While these league considerations
may provide some reassurance to a fan or city concerned with spon-
taneous team relocation, a hosting municipality should not rely ex-
clusively upon these NFL procedural relocation provisions to
protect against relocation; municipalities should provide them-
selves with as much protection against relocation as possible and
specifically contract for non-relocation covenants and rights in the
event of a breach in order to adequately protect taxpayer
interests.288
B. Safeguarding the Bills and Taxpayers Through
Lease Agreement
If the Bills and Erie County and New York State were intent on
keeping the Bills franchise in western New York, it would benefit
the state and local municipalities to add terms or provisions to the
new lease agreement designed to discourage the franchise from
leaving Buffalo.289
Similar to the non-relocation agreement executed in Houston
and Santa Clara, one option is to add a non-relocation provision to
the Bills’ new lease agreement or to create a separate non-reloca-
(8) Degree to which the team may have contributed to stadium
problems;
(9) Relocation demographics;
(10) Effect of relocation on current television contracts and labor
agreements;
(11) Effect of relocation on anticipated television contracts, particularly
as related to media market size;
(12) Effect of relocation on NFL division alignments, rivalries, travel re-
quirements, etc.
See id. (providing specific factors considered by NFL before franchise is allowed to
relocate); see also Policy and Procedures for Proposed Franchise Relocations, MINN. STATE
LEGISLATURE, http://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/issues/FootballSta-
dium/NFLFranchiseRelocationRules.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (discussing
more fully requirements under Section 4.3 of NFL bylaws).
287. Policy and Procedures for Proposed Franchise Relocations, supra note 286, § 3 R
(discussing factors that may be considered in evaluating proposed franchise
relocation).
288. See supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text (examining measures R
that other NFL teams have taken to deter franchise relocation).
289. See generally supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text (exploring meth- R
ods that other NFL teams have employed to preempt relocation issues).
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tion agreement to supplement the new lease agreement.290  Using
the Santa Clara non-relocation agreement as a guide, the Bills’
lease agreement could include terms providing for equitable reme-
dies in addition to remedies at law for a breach of the agree-
ment.291  To bolster the claim for equitable remedies for a breach,
Erie County should seek to include a provision stating that the par-
ties specifically contemplated these remedies because, although the
loss to Erie County from relocation would be significant, prospec-
tive losses are difficult to quantify with precision when such an
agreement is drafted.292  Further, Erie County should require the
Bills to provide written notice to Erie County prior to entertaining
offers from buyers seeking to relocate the franchise.293  Such a pro-
vision would encourage full disclosure and fair dealing between the
two parties and promote a cooperative and transparent environ-
ment for future negotiations and counter offers.294
Additionally, the agreement should contemplate the assign-
ment of the non-relocation clauses to any third party assignee that
succeeds Mr. Wilson in ownership.295  Change in ownership is im-
minent for the Bills and, similar to the Houston agreement, Erie
County should seek to include a provision stating that the assignee
assumes full responsibility for the performance of all obligations
that arise under the non-relocation provisions of the agreement.296
Such language will make it clear to the third party purchaser of the
Bills franchise that relocation of the franchise was specifically con-
templated to be in breach of the agreement.297
At a minimum, Erie County needs to protect any investment it
makes if and when it ultimately uses public funding to renovate
290. See supra notes 250-273 and accompanying text (examining Houston R
non-relocation agreement); see also supra notes 274-280 and accompanying text R
(examining Santa Clara non-relocation agreement).
291. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text (examining equitable R
remedies included in Houston non-relocation agreement).
292. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text (analyzing language use R
in Houston non-relocation agreement to protect Houston’s right to seek equitable
relief in event of breach).
293. See Houston Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 250, Article 3 § 3.3 (not- R
ing that Houston’s non-relocation agreement provides that notice must be given to
hosting municipality before team contemplates offers from other municipalities).
294. See generally id. (providing that notice has inherent effect of promoting
honest communication between contracting parties).
295. See id., art. 5 § 5.1(b) (introducing provision contemplating assignment
of agreement to third party assignee).
296. See id. (examining language used in Houston non-relocation agreement
to transfer obligations under agreement to assignee).
297. See generally id., Article 5 (explaining purpose of contemplating assign-
ment of agreement to third party assignee).
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Ralph Wilson Stadium.298  The Bills and Erie County should place
great emphasis on the negotiation of a liquidated damages provi-
sion.299  A liquidated damages provision contemplates a fixed
amount of money a breaching party promises to a pay the non-
breaching party in the event of a breach of the agreement.300  The
liquidated damages schedule in the new lease agreement with the
Bills should be drastically higher than the damages schedule pro-
vided by the 1998 lease agreement, especially if its purpose is to
deter relocation of the Bills franchise.301  The 1998 lease agreement
attached an early termination fee of $20 million for termination of
the lease in the first six years of the agreement and the fee de-
creases to $2 million for a termination in year fourteen.302  Specula-
tors anticipate that the Bills will be asked to guarantee $50 to $100
million as an early termination fee in the event that the Bills relo-
cate before the next lease agreement expires.303
Alternatively, Erie County could seek to include a provision re-
quiring the Bills to pay the outstanding principal, plus accrued in-
terest, fees and expenses on the stadium renovations loan.304  This
is consistent with the provisions included in the Santa Clara non-
298. See Gee, supra note 10 (reporting that taxpayers need to be protected if R
Bills franchise were to relocate – observers of Bills lease negotiations expect figures
of $50 to $100 million as liquidated damages fee).
299. See Heaney, supra note 4 (recognizing that parties must consider guaran- R
tees and/or penalties in place for when Ralph Wilson, Jr. dies).
300. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“[A liquidated damages
clause is a] contractual provision that determines in advance the measure of dam-
ages if a party breaches the agreement.  Traditionally, courts have upheld such a
clause unless the agreed-on sum is deemed a penalty for one of the following rea-
sons: (1) the sum grossly exceeds the probable damages on breach, (2) the same
sum is made payable for any variety of different breaches (some major, some mi-
nor), or (3) a mere delay in payment has been listed among the events of
default.”).
301. See id. (discussing liquidated damages clauses); see also Buffalo Bills Draft
Lease Agreements, Exhibit G, ERIE CNTY. WORKS, http://www.erie.gov/billslease/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (providing liquidated damages schedule, referenced in
agreement as “early termination fee schedule,” in Bills’ 1998 lease agreement with
Erie County).
302. See Buffalo Bills Draft Lease Agreements, supra note 301, Exhibit G (setting R
forth liquidated damages schedule in Bills’ 1998 lease agreement with Erie
County).
303. See Gee, supra note 10 (suggesting need for taxpayer protection if Bills R
franchise were to relocate – observers of Bills lease negotiations expect $50 to $100
million as liquidated damages fee).
304. See Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 274, § 5.2(b) (re- R
vealing provision employed by Santa Clara to ensure municipality is fully reim-
bursed for outstanding debt incurred through financing new stadium in event of
franchise relocation).
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relocation agreement and the Jacksonville lease agreement.305  In
sum, such a provision would allow Erie County to utilize a provision
asking the Bills to buy out the remainder of their lease by paying
the County what they still owe in the event of relocation before the
end of the lease term.306
As explored in the prior section, the NFL’s bylaws set forth a
procedure by which the NFL can permit or deny a team’s request to
relocate the franchise.307  An examination under Section 4.3 of the
NFL bylaws of the Bills’ current situation reveals mixed results.308
Although the NFL considers at least twelve factors in determining
whether to allow a team to relocate, several of these factors are es-
pecially relevant to the Bills’ current situation.309
For instance, the NFL would likely cite Buffalo Bills fan loyalty,
Erie County’s history of providing public financial support to the
Bills, the Bills’ financial performance, and the effect of the Bills’
relocation on NFL division alignments as significant factors against
allowing the Bills to relocate.310  While it is true that the Buffalo
Bills do not sell out every home game, as indicated by the fact that
there were three “blacked-out” games during the 2010 and 2011
Bills seasons, the Bills still maintain a strong fan base, especially for
a team that has not played a playoff game since 1999.311  Other in-
305. See id. (explaining provision used in Santa Clara Non-Relocation Agree-
ment stating that Santa Clara would be fully compensated for outstanding debt
incurred through financing new stadium in event of franchise relocation); see also
Gee, supra note 10 (noting that “Jacksonville allows the Jaguars to buy out their R
lease by paying off what they still would owe – estimated to be more than $100
million – or showing that they are losing money”).
306. See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text (summarizing purpose of R
including provision as fully compensating Erie County for outstanding debt in-
curred through financing stadium renovations in event of franchise relocation).
307. See supra notes 284-288 and accompanying text (outlining NFL proce- R
dure employed before NFL grants relocation, specifically examining Article 4.3 of
NFL bylaws).
308. For a further discussion of the Bills relocation analysis under Section 4.3,
see infra notes 309-319 and accompanying text. R
309. See supra notes 284-288 and accompanying text (outlining NFL proce- R
dure employed before NFL grants relocation, specifically examining Article 4.3 of
NFL bylaws).
310. For a further discussion of the factors disfavoring Bills franchise reloca-
tion under Article 4.3 of the NFL Bylaws, see infra notes 311-314 and accompany- R
ing text; see also supra note 286 and accompanying text (listing twelve factors NFL R
considers before allowing football franchises to relocate).
311. See Buffalo Bills, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/buffalo-bills/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (indicating that there were three blacked-out games in
2010 and 2011 Bills seasons); see also Stephen Watson, Blackout Gives Bills Fans Few
Alternatives, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 1, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.buffalo
news.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121201/CITYANDREGION/121209912
(explaining term “blacked-out” refers to NFL games where tickets do not sell out
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dications of a strong fan base in Buffalo include an analysis com-
piled by Forbes ranking Bills fans as the third most valuable on a
per capita basis in the NFL.312  Although unofficial and highly spec-
ulative, in 2012 the Bleacher Report ranked the Buffalo Bills fan
base as first among the ten most loyal in New York.313  Additionally,
Erie County has a strong history of supporting the Bills franchise,
from funding Ralph Wilson Stadium’s previous renovations in their
entirety to subsidizing the Bills’ operating costs, the taxpayers of
Erie County have demonstrated substantial public support for the
Bills.314
The Bills’ current financial position is also quite strong, indi-
cating the franchise’s sustainability as a viable business entity in
western New York.315  In 2011, the Bills earned $240 million in net
stadium revenues, which the team used for debt payment.316  In the
same year, the team’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization were $29.4 million.317  This operating income was
higher than fourteen other NFL teams, which indicates that the
team’s financial position remains viable.318  Lastly, moving the Bills
and local fans are unable to watch local game on TV); see also Tim Graham, Bills
Fans Rank Third in Dollar Value to Team, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://
blogs.buffalonews.com/press-coverage/2012/09/bills-fans-rank-third-in-dollar-
value-to-team.html (indicating Bills have strong fan base evidenced by fact that
Forbes ranks Bills fans as third most valuable on per capita basis, dividing each
team’s local revenue by local metro population); see also Matt Warren, 2011 Buffalo
Bills: Playoff Drought Drags On, BUFFALO RUMBLINGS (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.
buffalorumblings.com/2012/1/11/2697481/buffalo-bills-playoff-drought [herein-
after Warren III] (explaining that Bills haven’t made playoffs “since 1999, when
their season ended against the Titans in Tennessee during the wild card round.
Since then, Buffalo has had a winning record only once.”).
312. See Graham, supra note 311 (reporting that Forbes ranks Bills fans as R
third most valuable on per capita basis, by dividing each team’s local revenue by
local metro population).
313. See Amber Lee, The 10 Most Loyal Sports Fans in NY, BLEACHER REPORT
(June 4, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1201126-the-10-most-loyal-
sports-fans-in-ny/page/11 (ranking Buffalo Bills as most loyal fans in New York).
314. See Warren II, supra note 199 (indicating that in 1998, local and state R
government paid entire amount of renovation costs for Ralph Wilson Stadium); see
also Heaney, supra note 4 (reporting that under current lease agreement, Erie R
County subsidizes Bills operating expenses by providing operating subsidies of ap-
proximately $111 million over fifteen years).
315. For a detailed examination of Bills’ financial viability, see infra notes 316- R
319 and accompanying text. R
316. See Ozanian II, supra note 149 (ranking Bills twenty-ninth most valuable R
team out of thirty-two teams). See Buffalo Bills, supra note 311 (indicating that Bills R
net stadium revenues for 2011 was $240 million).
317. See Buffalo Bills, supra note 311 (noting Bills EBITDA for 2011 was $29.4 R
million).
318. See Ozanian II, supra note 149 (indicating that Bills had higher operating R
income than fourteen other NFL teams for 2011).
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franchise to a city such as Los Angeles would severely disrupt the
AFC East and conference rivalries, and would also likely cause sev-
eral division realignments.319
Currently, the most significant factors that the NFL would cite
in support of a potential Bills franchise relocation decision would
include stadium inadequacy and the Bills’ failed attempts to ad-
dress stadium situations in its current city.320  An inadequate sta-
dium serves as the Bills’ biggest Achilles heel, not only in terms of
stadium lease negotiations but also in terms of the overall viability
of the Bills franchise in western New York.321  A novel and creative
solution to the Bills’ stadium concerns could keep the Bills in Buf-
falo for decades to come; an inept and disingenuous solution could
cause the Bills to pack their bags and head for greener pastures.322
V. CONCLUSION
Whether a team seeks to finance a new or renovated stadium,
or a hosting municipality seeks to protect against franchise reloca-
tion, stadium financing and lease negotiation issues resonate on
some level with every NFL team and NFL hosting municipality.323
While this comment specifically examined the financing and con-
tracting options available to the Buffalo Bills, it should be noted
that every NFL team and hosting municipality can achieve a mean-
ingful and long-term stadium lease by exploring a variety of sta-
dium financing options and recognizing the parties’ underlying
interests and concerns.324
As the Buffalo Bills and Erie County prepare to make renova-
tions to Ralph Wilson Stadium, several financing options remain
319. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (noting that NFL considers R
effect of relocation on NFL division alignments, rivalries, travel requirements,
etc.).
320. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing Ralph Wilson Sta- R
dium’s need for stadium renovations and role of parties in achieving new lease
agreement).
321. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (providing two major issues R
keeping Bills and Erie County from reaching new lease agreement).
322. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (noting importance of find- R
ing efficient and effective solutions to major issues that face parties before new
lease agreement is achieved).
323. See supra notes 143-167 and accompanying text (providing analysis of fi- R
nancing arrangements made by other NFL teams to undergo stadium construction
or renovation projects); see also supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text (exam- R
ining measures NFL teams have taken to deter franchise relocation).
324. See generally supra notes 250-283 and accompanying text (examining mea- R
sures NFL teams have taken to deter franchise relocation and identifying concerns
that hosting municipalities have addressed through non-relocation agreements
and similar contracts).
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available.325  While a majority of the funding for such renovations
will likely come from public sources, collaboration between the Buf-
falo Bills franchise and the New York state and local government is
necessary to provide the required stadium renovations.326  In reach-
ing a new lease agreement, New York State and Erie County must
acknowledge their duty to protect the taxpayers from a significant
loss on investment if renovations are made to Ralph Wilson Sta-
dium and the franchise is subsequently sold and relocated.327  Pro-
visions in the new lease agreement between the two parties should
contemplate equitable remedies as one way of enabling Erie County
to seek action against the Bills in the event of a breach.328  The
agreement should also contemplate substantial liquidated damages,
or loan repayment obligations, from which the government can col-
lect to cover the Erie County taxpayers’ investment, should the Bills
breach the lease agreement by relocating.329
The Buffalo Bills have a rich history in western New York, and
in order to extend that history, Erie County, New York State and
the Bills must arrive at a reasonable compromise.330  Erie County
and New York State must recognize that there are plenty of financ-
ing options available to help pay the Bills.331  In return, the Bills
franchise must allow Erie County and its residents to protect their
investment in the Bills and Ralph Wilson Stadium because in the
325. See supra notes 65-193 and accompanying text (describing financing op- R
tions NFL teams have used for stadium construction).
326. See supra notes 194-249 and accompanying text (analyzing financing op- R
tions as they relate to Buffalo Bills).
327. See supra notes 289-322 and accompanying text (analyzing contracting R
options Erie County should seek to protect taxpayer investment in stadium
renovations).
328. See generally supra notes 289-322 and accompanying text (indicating that R
agreements between NFL franchises and hosting municipalities have stressed avail-
ability of equitable remedies under contract).
329. See generally supra notes 289-322 and accompanying text (indicating that R
agreements between NFL franchises and hosting municipalities have focused on
agreeing to substantial liquidated damages or repayment obligations under
contract).
330. See Buffalo Bills History, BUFFALO BILLS HISTORY, http://www.history.buf-
falobills.com/Buffalo+Bills+History (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (providing unique
history of Buffalo Bills); see also Buffalo Bills Community, BUFFALO BILLS, http://www.
buffalobills.com/community/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (indicating
Bills involvement in western New York community, including organized fitness,
health and safety, military appreciation, and community support events).
331. See supra notes 194-249 and accompanying text (examining several fi- R
nancing options available to fund renovation of Ralph Wilson Stadium).
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end, when it comes to giving Buffalo Bills fans something to cele-
brate, the Bills are due.332
VI. ADDENDUM
On December 21, 2012, the Buffalo Bills entered into a ten-
year lease agreement with Erie County and New York State to lease
Ralph Wilson Stadium to the Bills until 2023.333  The agreement
provides for a total of $130 million in stadium renovations, with
Erie County contributing $41 million, New York State contributing
$54 million, and the Bills contributing the remaining $35 mil-
lion.334  This marks the first time in the history of the parties’ lease
agreements that the Bills will make a team contribution toward the
renovation of Ralph Wilson Stadium.335
The agreement also envisions the construction of a new sta-
dium during the ten-year lease agreement.336  This may explain why
the agreement provided for roughly half of the $200 million the
Bills organization originally sought in the summer and fall of
2012.337  Bills’ CEO Russ Brandon acknowledged the possibility of a
new stadium in Buffalo in the next decade during the same press
conference in which he announced that the parties had reached an
agreement.338  Additionally, the new lease agreement includes a
provision allowing Erie County and New York State to take up to
half of the funding that they are slated to pay for annual stadium
332. See Gee, supra note 10 (reporting that taxpayers need to be protected if R
Bills franchise were to relocate; observers of Bills lease negotiations expect figures
of $50 to $100 million as liquidated damages fee).
333. See Tom Precious, Bills Agree to Lease Deal with $130 Million in Stadium
Upgrades, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.buffalonews.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121221/CITYANDREGION/121229867/1004 (reporting
lease agreement between Buffalo Bills and Erie County and New York State on
December 21, 2012).
334. See id. (reporting amount of contributions each party will make to fi-
nance stadium renovations).
335. See id. (noting Bills will make contribution toward renovations for first
time under new lease agreement).
336. See Matt Krueger, New Buffalo Bills Lease Makes Way for New Stadium, THE
CLARENCE BEE (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.clarencebee.com/news/2012-12-26/
Local_News/New_Buffalo_Bills_lease_makes_way_for_new_stadium.html (indicat-
ing provision in lease agreement to provide funding for new stadium in lieu of
funding stadium renovations).
337. See Heaney, supra note 4 (estimating cost of renovations at $200 million). R
338. See id. (quoting Russ Brandon, CEO of Buffalo Bills, when he an-
nounced, “I think what’s exciting about this is that we’re going to look at the po-
tential of a new stadium in the next decade or so and see if it makes sense for the
community.”).
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renovations during the last three years of the lease and invest it into
new stadium construction.339
The most noteworthy aspect of the agreement, however, is the
liquidated damages provision.340  The provision provides that the
Bills will pay $400 million in damages if the team leaves Buffalo
before 2023, with the exception that in year seven of the agree-
ment, damages will be temporarily reduced to $29 million.341  After
year seven, the damages provision increases to $400 million for the
final three years of the agreement.342  This is substantially higher
than the estimates provided by individuals close to the lease negoti-
ations, who anticipated a liquidated damages provision in the range
of $50-$100 million.343  Although some have advocated for the pro-
vision as a win for a team that is not accustomed to winning, others
have expressed concern over the drastically lower damages provi-
sion in year seven.344
The agreement concentrated on the two most critical factors
identified in this comment: (1) how financing for the stadium
would be split amongst the parties, and (2) which provisions should
339. See Krueger, supra note 336 (reporting that “[i]n years eight, nine and R
[ten] of the deal, the state and county can take half of the money it pays for annual
upgrades on Ralph Wilson Stadium and put it toward design and construction of a
new facility”).
340. See generally Precious, supra note 333 (emphasizing liquidated damages R
provision in article).
341. See id. (reporting that “[t]he terms call for a $400 million penalty if the
team leaves Buffalo before 2023 with the exception that, after the seventh year, the
team would pay only $29 million.  After that year, the penalty would go back to
$400 million.”).
342. See id. (identifying year seven of new lease agreement as critical because
in year seven, liquidated damages are reduced to $29 million and after year seven,
liquidated damages increase to $400 million for last three years of lease
agreement).
343. See Gee, supra note 10 (reporting that observers of Bills lease negotia- R
tions expected figures of $50 to $100 million as liquidated damages fee).
344. See Terrence McCracken, Lease a Win-Win for Buffalo Bills, Residents, and
Community Growth, CHEEKTOWAGA BEE (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.cheektowa-
gabee.com/news/2013-01-10/Editorials/Lease_a_winwin_for_Buffalo_Bills_re-
sidents_and_com.html (highlighting new lease agreement provisions as win for
Bills franchise, win for residents of Buffalo, and win for community growth); see
also Joe Buscaglia, Bills Instill Both Hope and Fear with New Stadium Lease, WGR 550
SPORTS RADIO, (Dec. 21, 2012), http://wgr550.com/BUSCAGLIA-Bills-instill-both-
hope-and-fear-with-ne/15098777 (explaining “the fact that an opt-out clause after
the seventh year for a paltry (by NFL standards) $28,363,500 was worked in, and
that it was mentioned briefly at best during the press conference, it should be a
tiny cause of concern to Bills fans looking for long-term security for their favorite
football team.”).
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be included to deter the Bills’ franchise from relocating.345  While
there is no doubt that this agreement helps the Bills’ franchise re-
main viable in western New York in the short term, the problems it
attempted to remedy will soon resurface for the Buffalo Bills, Erie
County, and New York State.346  Namely, the Bills’ ownership suc-
cession plan remains a mystery, and depending on when the team is
sold, year seven of the agreement (the year in which the damages
provision is reduced to $29 million) will be critical in the contem-
plation of a possible relocation of the franchise.347
Additionally, the money allocated toward stadium renovations
is only a temporary solution for one of the oldest stadiums in the
league.348  In the same press conference that announced the ex-
tended stadium lease agreement, state, county, and team officials
all acknowledged the possibility of building a new stadium during
the lease term as a potential short term solution to keep Ralph Wil-
son Stadium operational until a better solution can be achieved.349
Moreover, the Bills continue to struggle to achieve a winning NFL
record; in 2012 the Bills extended their playoff drought to thirteen
straight seasons, finishing last in their division for the fifth year in a
row.350  With these issues still in play and largely unaddressed by the
recent lease agreement, it will not be long before the question of
345. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (providing two major issues R
which prevented Bills and Erie County from reaching new lease agreement
sooner).
346. For a further discussion of some of the problems left unaddressed under
the new lease agreement, see infra notes 347-350 and accompanying text. R
347. See Mike Harrington, Bills Lease Deal Raises Fans’ Spirits, THE BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 29, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.buffalonews.com/apps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20121228/CITYANDREGION/121229340/1004 (reporting that
“[t]here are plenty of nagging questions about the Bills’ lease, especially since the
team can get out of it after year seven for the relatively small sum of $28.4 million.
And even if it goes to completion, the Ralph will be nearly 50 years old and far past
its prime as an NFL venue.”).
348. For a further discussion of why the new lease agreement is only a tempo-
rary fix, see infra notes 349-351 and accompanying text. R
349. See Krueger, supra note 336 (reporting “[s]tate, county, and team offi- R
cials all commented on the possibility of a new stadium being constructed in West-
ern New York during [the press conference on Dec. 21, 2012] to announce the
new 10-year lease agreement”).
350. See Buffalo Bills’ Win Over New York Jets Might Not Save Chan Gailey’s Job,
NFL.COM, (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000119430/
article/buffalo-bills-win-over-new-york-jets-might-not-save-chan-gaileys-job (report-
ing that Bills “finished fourth in the AFC East for a fifth straight time while ex-
tending their postseason drought to 13 years”).
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“who is going to pay the Bills?” once again surfaces in western New
York.351
Benjamin S. Bolas*
351. See supra notes 347-350 and accompanying text (explaining issues that R
still need to be resolved concerning Bills franchise and Ralph Wilson Stadium).
* J.D./L.L.M. Candidate, May 2014, Villanova University School of Law;
M.B.A., Canisius College, 2011; B.S. cum laude, Canisius College, 2010.
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